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The breakthrough of the extreme right during the last decade is a phenomenon
that has gathered attention worldwide. This thesis examines the rise of the extreme right
in France and Gennany and the problem of immigration.
The present study analyses the extreme right placed in a historical context. First
through a consideration of the evolution of the extreme right in the early yean of the
post-war period. its minor presence from the late 19505 to the 19805. and the rise of the
extreme right during the last decade with the appearance of the Front Nalional and the
Republilwner. The analysis of immigration considers patterns of Western European
inunigration., new trends in European migration., the increase of racism and xenophobia
directed towards immigrants. and the perceptions of some Western Europeans regarding
national idet:ltity. economy and immigration. The thesis focuses upon the Front National
and the RepubliJcaner. particularly their dectoral perfonnance. their appeal and their
supporters.
The study attempts to determine the influence that the immigration problem has
had in explaining the rise of Ute extreme right. The thesis considers whether or not the
problem of immigration explains the rise of the extreme right; ways in which the extreme
right has linked immigration and socio-cconomic problems. and the extent to which
immigration, as opposed to other factors. provides an explanation for the rise of the
extreme right in France and Gennany.
The thesis argues that immigration is a leading causal factor in explaining the
vote for the extreme right. However. the relationship is complex. Nevertheless three
conclusions emerge: first. immigration is an issue that appeals to a substantial portion of
the population and the extreme right has been successful at exploiting it and crystallizing
the fears ofsome sectors of the population. Second. xenophobia is an important element
in explaining the rise of the extreme right. lmmigr.ation is associated with the presence of
immigrants fiom non-European countries. 1mJnigrants have become the symbol for a
complex pattern of concerns of some native Western Europeans. Third. problems
associated with immigration also account for the rise of the extreme right. The problem
of immigration is related to a crisis of multiculturalism that seems to be taking place in
some Western European societies. Immigration is also associated with unemployment.
Some marginalized sectors of the population see immigrants as competitors for social
services and employment. Thus, as long as the problem of immigration is not resolved
and the: problems associated with it continue, the potential for the success of the: extreme
right will remain.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The specter of right-wing extremism is haunting Europe today. Although the
extreme right seemed to disappear along with Nazism and Fascism after the Second
World War. it never completely vanished. The long economic boom of the post·war
period favoured parliamentary democracy and condemned the extreme right to the
periphery of the political system. However, the resurgence of ideological and political
turbulence in the 19605 contributed to a transfonnatioD of West European politics. Rising
conflicts in the 19705 and 1980s and the spread of mass protest by new social movements
and citizen initiatives served as a fertile ground for new sources of radicalism. By the
early 199Os, extreme·right parties had emerged in almost every country in Western
Europe. Examples include the National Front in France and Britain. Republicans in
Germany. the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. the Center Party in the
Netherlands., the Freedom Party in Austria, the Flemish Block. in Belgiwn and the
Northern League in Italy.
The breakthrough of the extreme right has been considered a signal of an
imponant transfonnarion ofpolirics in advanced Western democracies. The new wave of
right-wing extremism has been the most successful of the post·war period both in an
electoral and an ideological sense. Newspaper articles about the electoral success of
extreme-right parties in Western Europe are common. Recent electoral trends illustrate
the rise of the extreme right in Western democracies; most of these parties have been able
to expand their votes and parliamentary representation. In Germany the Republikaner
pany received 7.1 pettent of the vote in 1989 and 4.3 pt:I"Unt during the 1994 European
parliamentary election. In Ihe 1990 Bundestag election Ihe pany received 1.3 percent of
Ihe vote and in Ihe 1994 federal election 1 percent. In France,lhe From National won IS
percent of Ihe vote in the 1995 presidential elections and elected more than one thousand
mem~ 10 municipal councils and three mayors in Ihe local elections that followed the
same year. Also, during the first round of the parliamentary elections in May 1997. the
Front scored IS pettent of the vote and won one seat in Ihe Chambre des Deputes.
Definition oUhe extreme righl
Allhough many scholars have written about the extreme right, Ihere is little
agreement among them about how to define an extreme-right palty or the way in which
the cxlmne right differs from patties of Ihe right or the new right. The literature abounds
with a multitude of terms such as right-wing radicalism, Fascism, n~Fascism.l nco-
Nazism, nationalism. far right, radical-right. ultra·right. right-wing populism. new right
or extreme right.
In Ihe Oxford Companion to Po/ilics oflhe World. Krieger distinguishes between
the concepts of right and n~ righl. 2 The term righl is used to characterize the
conservative end of the political spect:rum in modem polities. Political parties,
movements and ideas sharing a commitment to the advancement of conservative.
economic, social and political arguments belong to Ihe righl. The right is suspicious of
the idea of progress and is generally committed to the status quo; its tendency is
I The lmDS Nuiand Fascist5bould~~lCdlOlhepanieliandlJ'QUp5orlbe posI-wacperiod which
radi1y~emeit ideo~and ill sorDeQK5 orsaniDtiotWcbcml fnxD $Udl p&nX$.
invariably nationalist; its adherents want a lean but strong government that does not
interfere with their actions. Conservativ~ principles of the right also include the
veneration of religion. loyalty and a system of social hierarchy. On the other hand. the
term new right refers to a range ofconservative and liben1 ideas including a conunitment
to individual freedom and the primacy of the free market in preference to state
intervention. The new right approach promotes the conservative values of inequality,
social hierarchy and traditional moralism.) The new n'ght is also conceptualized as the
populist extreme version of a "'neo-conservative reaction to fundamental change in
culture and values in Western democracies".4 The new right network is considered a
conglomerate of organizations. movements and political panies, who attempt to mobilize
the neo-conservative ideological potential in the West European public.
Defining the exD"eme right is not an easy task. Right·wing extremism is a broad
coocept that is neither static nor precise. lbe tenn right-wing extreMum has been applied
to individuals, parties, movements and organizations across the world. It has also been
used to refer to a wide range of phenomena from skinhead youths to neo-Nazis, white
supremacists, militia groups. extremist fringe political parties and more successful radical
political parties.S Thus, right-wing extremism consists of many different fonns. It can
refer to an ideology. a fonn of behaviour, political activities or personal attitudes and
dispositions.
: Joel Krieger. Thl: Oxford COmpaniOD to Politics alibI; World. NY: Oxford Un.ivl;Qity PrI:S5, 1993.431.
1 Kr\l;ger,43! .
• Micbal:l MiketlbnJ. "The New Rig.11I in Germany. The TnnslormatiC)Q olConservatism and the Extmne
Rig.hL~EuropeanJOWII.II ofPolitieal Resear<;h. 22(1992), S6.
1Mic;hi EtMp., "Ri&ht-wiDJ Extmnism: in Seatehofl IkfLllitiOll.-, The Extreme RighL Freedom and
~ Ed. AuRl BraUDaud Slepberl ScMinbn'&- (USA: Wesrview Pres$., 1997) IS.
It is aJso useful to distinguish between an economic right and a cultural right. The
economic right refers to the neo-liberal model that favours free trade. globalization. lower
corporate taxes. reduction of state expendilUreS. privatization and related issues. Ralher
than wanting an authoritarian state.. this economic right prefers laissez-fain. In contrast.
the cultural right is often opposed to free trade and is more preoccupied with national
issues such as security and identity. This tendency has an authoritarian conception of the
state and generally encourages strong government regulations on issues such as
immigration and law and order. II is within the framework of a cultural right that we can
locale some of the characteristics of an extreme-right party.
Many authors look at the definilion of extreme right from different perspectives.
Husbands distinguishes four models of right-wing extremism: populist national parties.
nco-Fascist parties. nationalist extreme-right parties and traditional xenophobic parties. b
Unfortunately. Husbands does not mention what the basis of this classification is for the
various models. In an anatomy of right-wing politics. Hagtvet: asserts that these panies
share chancteristics such as rejection of democracy. populism. nationalism. exclusion.
pessimism. emphasis on law and order. violence, anti-Communism and authoritarianism.'
Hagtvet explains that these parties reject existing forms of representative government and
Ihe democratic values that inform them. They arc populisl in the sense that they criticize
the activities of the elites while emphasizing ordinary people's right to determine the
cOnlent of politics. He also maintains that extreme-right parties insist on the excellence of
their own nation. emphasize its history as particularly glorious. and include allusions to
• CbristopbC'f HlISbands. 1110: 0th0:T Face or 1992; tbc Ell!=TIC-RJaht Explosion Ln WeslC'l'1l Eun:Jpc".
PmWnclltarV AfTain (1992) 45.3
its past in theiTpolitical discourse. Hagtvet claims lhat the patriotic attitudes of right.wing
extremists drive them into ethnocentrism. which assumes racist expressions. They also
share a view that the world can be saved from decadence only by ethnic control and
orderly social hierarchy based on traditional norms ofobedience and social submission.
This definition of the extftme right is complemented by the study of Cas Mudde.
Based on an analysis of the party literature. Mudde identified five features of the
exueme.right ideology: nationalism., racism, xenophobia. anti-democracy and a strong
state. Mudde defines nationalism. as "the political doctrine that proclaims the congruence
of the political unit. the state. and the culrural unit, the nation". I He argues that extreme·
right parties stress the irnponance of external exclusiveness in their manifestos.'! He also
emphasizes the new racism that characterizes the extreme right. Aceording to this new
racism, all races are equivalent and have the right to develop separately; however, this
development must lake place within their own culture. IO Xenophobia is introduced as an
irnponant element in the discourse of right-wing extremism; Mudde explains that
xenophobia has been used as a collective noun for descriptions of fear, hate or hostility
regarding ethnic foreigners.
In his directory on organizations of the extreme right, Maolain distinguishes
several attributes of the radical right: violence as a political tactic; authoritarianism;
nationalism to the point of xenophobia; opposition 10 immigration; commitment 10
I Brent Hagtvet, MRig.ht_Wlng Extremism in EllfOPC". Journal orPeace Research (1994) 3\.3
'Cas Mudde. MRight_Wing Extmnism Ana.1~".European Journal Qrpolitical Research. (1995) 209.
·EJtlema.lexclU$iYenessrererstotlttC'Yenllhallstate~dstohaveallpeoplebe:louginglClilSuarion
withiDil5bordtts.I. The pIlliey orncial 5earegaQOQ implemented hy the Naticmal Party In South Africa proclaimed Ihe
privilege orall races to -=quin hIunan rlpl5 INI it~ Slated thall'lCts should be: COIlfmed to a panieuLar
geographiea.lregioo.
lraditionaJ values and opposition to immorality; opposition to Communism; individual
heroism. and perception of the existing social order as decadent and corrupt. 11 Ebata
enumerates as the most durable characteristics of the extreme right the centrality of
hatred towards outsiders. nationalism. anti·Sermtism and violence. 12 In a more confined
explication. 5t655 has defined right.wing extremism as the "totality of anti·democratic
attitudes and behaviour patterns directed against parliamentarian or pluralist systems of
govemment... 1J In his view. right-wing extremism is a rejection of democracy and the
liberal democratic state. Using the characteristics mentioned by these authors, it is
possible 10 identify the general attribules of an extreme-right party (table 1.1).
Table 1./ Charlleteristics (It) orextreme-right p"rties
Hagvet Mudde Maolain Ebata
Anti-democracy
Populism
Nationalism
Authoritarianism
Anti-Communism
Violence
Racism
Xenophobia
Pessimism
Based on the table. we can conclude that an extreme-right pany is highly
nationalistic and authoritarian. However. two of the characteristics that differentiate them
II Ciaran 0 Maolain. The Radical Right. A World DireclOry. (UK: ABC-CLlO, 1987) viii.
I: Eb.ata. 16.
IJ Richard SlOSS, Politics Againsl Democracy. Rir.bl-wing Extremism. in Wesl <ft,nnany. (NY: Berg. 1991j
IS.
from other parties. including those of the right, are the importance attached to racism and
xenophobia and the use of political violence as a means to accomplish their ends.
Extreme-right parties in France and Germany share many of these characteristics.
The Front National for instance. is highly nationalistic and its policies celebrate violence
and refer to xenophobia and the threat that immigrants represent to its country. According
[0 some authors. the Front National also represents pessimism about the future among
certain sectors of the population. 14 In the case of Germany. right-wing extremism includes
political parties and action groups whose members hold authoritarian. nationalist and racist
views. They emphasize the need for law and order in a society free of conflict. They are also
intolerant of different opinions. ready 10 accuse their enemies and in some cases willing to
use violence to accomplish Uteir ends. Some of these tendencies are well represented by
political parties. For example. the RepubliJcaner party program is xenophobic and
nationalist. It talks of the need to Gumaniu the Germans. warns about Ute invasion of
foreigners, defames democratic institutions. makes lighl of Nazi crimes and denies Gcmtan
responsibility for the Second World War. IS
The extreme right in Franet and Germany
AlthOUgh the rise of the extreme right has acquired considerable imponance in
Europe in the last decade, exlJ'e'lnist movements are not new in European history; on the
contrary. Ute extreme right has been a permanenl element in the modem history of France
.. MkbaliDa Vau&han.11le UtrrnlC: Right in France: Lepe1lislflc:or Ihe: Politics orFcar~. The Far RighI in
We$fCl'U aDd WIC:nl Europe. e:d. Luciano Cbe:1e:$. Roanie FCfiUSOn aod Micbal.iu Vaug!wl (Eng1a!ld:
LoI1JlIWl.. 1995} 227.
and Gennany. In France, the twentieth century has witnessed me rise and fall ofdifferent
right-wing extremist groups that have challenged the institutions of the Republic but have
never been able to obtain significant power. However, the past two decades can be
considered a period of success for the extreme righL, because of the increasing presence
of the Front National. Germany, on the other hand, bas experienced one of the most
dangerous expressions of the extreme right, Nazism. Both the Nazi experience and the
strict control imposed on the activities of the extreme right during the post·war period
confined the extreme right to a variety ofminor organizations with no political relevance.
These include the Economic Reconstruction Association (WAV), the Gennan Rightist
Party (DRP), the NationaJ Democratic Party (NDP), and most recently the German
People's Union (DVU). The NDP achieved success during the federal election of 1969.
However, it was not until the tate 1980s that the RepubUkaner became the fiI1t extreme-
right party to achieve continuous electoral success. At the time of the Repubiwmer
success, Gennany witnessed the revival of violent right-wing extremism expanding
throughout the country.
The Front National represents the extreme right in France today. The Front
National is the third most popular party in French politics and one of the most imponant
extreme-right parties in Europe. The Front has achieved significant electoral victories and
by doing so has affected the course of politics in France. Today, the Front Na/ional
controls the city halls of major towns in the South including Orange, Toulon and
lSGentd BraundW,lbe RiseO(Righl.Wml Extremism in the NewOmnaay~. The Domestic Politieso(
Gaman UniftcaDOn, ed. CbrisIopllu Anderson, Karl K'ltcnthaler aDd Wolfang Lulhardt (Colondo: Lynne
Rienne<! Publisberslnc.. 1991)97.
Vitrolles; it has eleven delegates in lhe European Parliament in Strasbourg and thousands
of representatives on regional and municipal councils. If>
In Germany, a political party, the Republikaner, also represents the extreme right
However, contrary 10 the case of France, the Republikmter share lhe periphery of the
political arena with other political parties such as !be Deu1sche Volbunion (DVU) and the
NotionaJdemokromche Pond DelilschItucd (NPD). Although the RepublilaJner has been
the mOsl importanl electoral force of the extreme right during the post-war, il has not
equaled the strength of the Front National. This relative weaknesses can be explained not
only by the Nazi experience that Germany endured during the Second World War, but
also by the establisbment of a new democratic system under the Feden..l Republic. During
the early 19SOs. the Constitution and EleclOral Law favoured the presence of a few strong
parties lhat share power through coalitions. Ibis threshold has prevented the entry of
small parties like the Republikaner in the Federal Parliament. 17 However, instead. of being
successful in the electoral arena. the extreme right has found its expression in clandestine
neo-Nazi groups. These organiutions, the most militant of the extreme-right movement.
have captured international attention because of their hostility and violence IOwards
foreigners. In MOUn. one Turkisb woman and !wo girls died and several others were
wounded when!Wo local skinheads ftrebombed their house during the night ofNovembeT
I. PlliIlip Golltevieb. "'Tbe Unthinkable. How Dangerous is Lc: Pen's FN'!" The New Yorker. (April-May.
1991) 110.
Il Afthoup it coukt be argued tballbe: fivepereem fIoof is radla lenefOUS Ie SIDlI.II panic:s. m practice.
five perunI is, hip tbTubold.lD lbec:ue ofGennany, maiDsa'eam.polllies bad benldominated by the
CDlJ/CSU. SPD and FOP until the IaIe 19805 ",ben me GTeeos QbQiDed seats ill: me BIlJIdI!SItlJ.
23, 1992. This was just one of more than 700 cases of arson with a presumed right-wing
motivation occwring in Germany that year. II
The appeal orthe extreme right
Understanding the appeal of parties of the extreme right is not an easy task. The
literature does not provide a single theory that can be used as a reference for explaining
the rise and success of the conlemporary extreme right Instead. writings abound with
different explanations that nevertheless make possible the identification of some of the
factors that account for their success. Different authors have studied the extreme righl;
they look at it from economic, social and political perspectives. However, a significanl
element in understanding the rise of the extreme right is its association with the problem
of immigration.
II is important to understand that the issue of immigration per se is not enough to
account for the success of the extreme right. The issue of immigration appears in a
context of changes that European society is undergoing. These changes refer to the
restructuring of the economy, a sense of dissatisfaction with tr.uiitional political panies
and the transformation ofparty politics.
From an economic perspective, different theories argue that the potential fOT right-
wing extremism exists in all Western societies because their economies are undergoing
post-industrial transitions. The comradictions in this process result in threats 10 social and
I'TonBjorJo. MlattoductioD-. Tmurfromlbc Ex~Riaht.(Loadoa:Fnmlr.CauaodCo.Lid.., 1995) I.
10
economic security and affect groups who feel rnargin.a..lised by social change.l' According
10 this premise. those who have lost their status and economic security as a resull of the
decline of older induslrial sectors vole for the extreme righl as a form of prolesl.
Increasing economic and social competition has created a pool of resentful citizens who
seek gratification and social acceptance. These theories also explain that righl.wing
extremism flourishes in the lower strata of society during times of economic stagnation
and rising unemployment. The poor. economically the moS! exposed segments of the
population, perceive foreign groups as unwanled rivals in me competition for scarce jobs
and social resources. This results in the revival of nationalist and racist attitudes.21l
Geoffrey Harris attributes the emergence of right.wing ideologies to the crisis that
has followed after decades of rapid social change. In panicular. he emphasises the rise of
unemployment plus the presence of immigrants in explaining me instability of the
political system, which, according to him, provides an excellent political opportunity for
the extreme righLJl Similarly, Von Beyme studies the development of the righl.wing
extremist parties since the post-war_ He assens thai waves of social deprivation prepared
the way for extremism, facilitated by unemployment and xenophobia.22
Richard S1655 claims that favourable conditions for work. production and income
are an important requirement for people's personal satisfaction; permanent shortcomings
" Eva Kolinsky, M A Furore for RighI Extrenili:m in Germany'!" The Extreme Right in Europe and the
USA. ed. Paul Hainsworth (NY: SI. Martin's Press, t992).
lrjiiul Hainsworth, "hltroduetion. The Cutting Edge: the Extreme RiJllt in PO$lWar Western Europe &lJd
the USA~. The Extreme R.i&ln in Europe&Dd the USA. cd. Paul Hainfwonh{NY: St. Martin'5 Press. 1992).
II Geoffrey Harris. The Dan: Side of Europe: tile Extreme Right TodaY,(EdinbuJgh: Edinbursb UDiversity
Press.l994).
U Klaus Von Beyme, -Riibt-Wil'Il ExtrelDism ill Post-war EuropeM West EI.!n!pC!I! Politics 15.2 (1992).
11
in any of these leads to dissatisfaction in those concerned.. Stoss also states that a further
important cause ofanti-democratic attitudes is relative deprivanon.ll He uses this to refer
to quantitative or temporal differences in the developments of different economic
branches or different social groups. Stoss stresses in particular structural changes in
industrial society which have caused greater inequality between traditionaJ and emerging
sectors of the economy or between those who have gained from modernisation and those
who have lost. He maintains that being affecled by this crisis creales a feeling of being
disadvantaged and of alienation and isolation that stimulales prejudice towards
outsiders.H
Hans-Georg Betz asserts that at the time of the Front Nationa'·s electoral
breakthrough, French society h.ad gone through a prolonged period of malaise. He
explains thai Ibis was made worse by the economic recession. austerity measures.
mounting sociaJ tension over unemployment and growing crime rates, which were
increasingly associated with the Socialist government's policies. Betz suggests thai
during the mid.1980s, when the FN became an electoral force, the French public was
disaffected from all major parties and profOWldly sceptical about their ability to solve
France's most urgenl problems. Thus, the Front's success was in pan a reflection of a
profound malaise caused both by economic crisis and the general direction of the
evolulion of French society.
::Inc IemI n((Jnw dqrir.vtiott is different from die oae ofT.H. Runciman who UJUe5 WI people accepl
irlequa.lily ~use!bey sec 1hrir OWII deprivation 1101 ill absolute tenD$, butl"C:lati.~ 10 others who are
W!lBeof[
l4 SlOSS. Polide$ASaUw. Demoqacy. 21).
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Bel%: also argues that as Gennan voters grew increasingly pessimistic about the
state of the Gennan economy as well as their personal economic situation in the early
19905, the electorate grew more and more disenchanted with the established parties. He
suggests lhat the Gennan public's deep resentment toward the political class was caused
by two factors: on the one band the established parties' and politicians' failure to preserve
lhe Gennan model of stability and prosperity, and on the other, their failure to show
strong leadership, depart fonn the status quo and show creativity and political
innovation.ll
Political explanations attribute the support for the extreme right to a general sense
of disillusionment with the political system as a whole that is manifested in a growing
lack of confidence in the functioning of its institutions. The explanatory factors behind
this premise are resentment and alienation. Mainstream parties have lost the confidence
of many citizens. The main parties no longer seem legitimate. Politicians are viewed as
unresponsive to citizens' concerns and interested in the electorate's votes but not in its
demands. In response. many voters voice their protest at the ballot box by supponing
extreme-right panies. Some scholars explain that while traditional parties neglected
popular concerns, extreme·right parties presented themselves as political alternatives by
articulating ideas and themes that were crucial for the electorate. By addressing these
issues. the extreme right has mobilized suppon at the expense of traditional parties.
From this perspective, Bel%: attributes the rise and increasing success of extreme·
right parties to voter alienation. From this perspective, extreme.right parties are primarily
interpreted as parties of discontent, whicb have managed to exploit voter dissatisfaction.
.u HUl$-Geoc'J Betz. Radical Righl.WiDgPopu!UJniDWestcnl Eurcp.(NY: St. M&Itin's Press. 1994)S8.
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Betz also asserts that a growing number of citizens believe that the established political
class is no longer able to solve lhe most basic problems because politicians are 100 self·
absorbed to be able to adapt to a rapidly changing world. He maintains that a growing
number of voters feel politicians lack. the competence, integrity and vision necessary to
respond to such issues as unemployment. crime and immigration.2•
Westle and Niedermayer support this hypothesis by asserting that in the case of
Germany the Repub/ilumer:S voters do not have an extreme-right ideology but vote for
the party as a protest_ In their view. the party has benefited from socio-economically and
politically motivated dissatisfaction because established parties have failed to respond to
these problems. Individuals with a lack of trust in the democratic political institutions are
overrepresented among RepubliluIner supporters. When the established parties do not
respond quickly enough to new social problems and changes in issue priorities. some
citizens regard their own policy preferences as DOt being represented anymore within the
established party system.n Kitschelt and McGann assert that Republikaner supporters are
more racist, nationalist and ethnocenaic than the followers of other parties. However. it
would be erroneous to see RtpUblikaner voters as fanatic nC(>Nazis. Rather they are people
protesting government's policies such as allowing too many foreignen: to come into
Germany or tolerating high unemployment 21
Husbands. on the other hand, asserts that although the votes for Le Pen and his party
have been considered protest votes. the Front electorate seems to be aware of. attracted to
lIOBecz,ibdicaIRight.Wirlg.41.
~'BetinaWestkandOskvNi~yer,"CODtempoTaJyRi&!lt.Wing Extmr\i$mmWestGennany. The
RqNblibner and their EI«lOnlC-. Eurooean Journal of Politieal Researth.. 22.3 (1992).
and interested in the implementation of the Front's program. Front voters are mo~
commined to and mo~ loyal to Le Pen and the Front than are the supponers of any other
French political party. According 10 Husbands. 7 to 9 percent of tile French electorate bas
developed a genuine partisan anactunent to iL 2'l Members. especially activists., have a much
greater sense of mission than members ofthe mainstream panies.
A major shift in the defining issues of party politics bas also been an important
element in explaining the appeal of the extreme right. In the past, there: was a correlation
between social classes and inlerest groups or specific political parties, with classes,
groups and parties dividing along the same lines over issues concerning the economy or
religion. However, this is not longer the case.
Ronald Inglehart interprets !he success ofextreme-right parties as part of a secular
shift in advanced Western democracies from class-based to issue-based politics.Xl He
explains that the politics of advanced industrial societies no longer polarize primarily on
the basis of working class versus middle class, and thai the old issues. centering on
ownership of the means of production, no longer lie at the heart of political polarization.
Inglehan asserts thai Western politics are coming to polarize according to "social class
less and less and according 10 values more and more...J1 He argues that in the context of
economic development in the posl-war era, there has been a shift from materialist
towards pOSi-materiaiiSi issues. Because this shift involves basic goals. it implies a
gradual change in the types of issues that are most central to political conflicts and in Ihe
:I Haben Kitsehclt and ADtbony McGann. The Radical Righi in Wcstern Europe. (USA: The Universiry of
~~~Press~~~Face of 1992: lM Extreme-Righi Explosion iII WeslUD Europc~, 27].
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types of political movements and parties that people support. Then:fore, the rise of post·
materialist issues tends 10 neutralize political polariDtion based on social class.
According 10 Stein Rokkan and SM. Lipset, mass politics in conlemporary
Europe had been structured by four major cleavages. Two of !hese cleavages emerged
when the central nalion·building cultures came inlO conflict with peripher.tl subject
cultures on the one hand and wi!h the corporate privileges of the Church on the other
hand. These cleavages were center versus periphery and Church versus State. The other
two cleavages emerged from the Industrial Revolution and crystallized oppositions
between the old landed interests and the new industrialists on the one hand and the
owners of the capital and the new working class on the other. The authors assen that the
introduction of universal suffrage "froze'· these cleavage structures. The party system of
!he 1960s reflected the same cleavages of the 1920s. According 10 this hypothesis, the
party a1lernatives and in many cases the party organizations were older than the
majorities of the national electorates. The developmenl of party organizations around
these cleavages pre-cmpted the emergence of a1ternale alignments. Thus the closure of
the electoral market and the enduring capacity of cleavages to structur'e political
behaviour left little room for the emergence of new cleavages or new polilics.J:
The "freezing" hypothesis proved 10 be almost immune 10 challenge though the
early 1970s. However. different arguments assert that there are signs that the structure of
party systems, frozen for so long. is beginning to thaw. lnglehart assens that although
XI Ronald llIglcban. ~From Qus.bascd to Valuc-based Policic:s~, Thc West European Party SVSIem. cd.
PClCr Mail (NY; Oxford Ullivcnity Pres.s. 1990) 276.
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deep-rooted political party alignments continue to shape voting behaviour in many
countries. they no longer reflect the forces most likely to mobilize people to become
politically active.ll Since the early 1910s, questions about immigration., national unity
and national identity have emerged. These issues sometimes divide existing parries or
provide points around which factions or panies may be organized. In many instances.
specific issues have increased in importance because potential voters are bound less by
traditional party preferences and more inclined to opt for the political party which they
perceive to be capable of addressing itself to the issues in question.
Ignazi argues that there are new demands, largely unforeseen. by me established
parties. These demands include law and order enforcement and immigration control. two
demands which are leading issues for new right-wing parties. Ignazi also asserts that the
inability of the established parties to provide an answer to the problem of immigration
has favoured the development of extreme-right parties, which advocate xenophobic and
racist: positions.~
Following Ignazi's argument, Eva Kolinsky also maintains that issues have
increased in importance as potential voters are bound less by traditional party preferences
and more inclined to opt for the political party which they perceive to be capable of
addressing itself to the priority issue in question. For that matter, the single most
important issue for electoral and organisational success of the extreme right has been that
of hostility towards foreigners. Kolinsky attributes the appeal of the Republilwner in
I: Peter Mail". Party Sys'lem Cbanlle. Approaehcs &lid I.o.tetpretlltiOllS, {USA: Oxford UDivenily Press.
1997)57.
" Mail, 59.
Germany to a trend towards issue politics. She argues that since the early 1970s the
"broad-church" approach to policy anieulation which has been the hallmarlc of the
German catch·all panics no longer satisfies voter's expectations. Instead, citizens'
initiatives and new social movements have built their political roles on specific issues.
which seemed to be bypassed by mainstream panies.
Simmons makes similar arguments about France. He claims that there has been a
major shift in issues defining party politics. Questions concerning immigration and law
and order constitute new tines of division among societal groups and political panies.
Simmons claims thai as the COITelation between class and party weakens. and as the
centrality of questions concerning the role of the state in the economy gives way to
concern over national identity, comlption in politics. immigration. crime and housing, a
broad cross-section of the French electorate has turned to the extreme right for answers.U
The issue ofimmigration
The key in understanding the success of the extreme right lies in the importance
of the issue of immigration. The immigration issue has been used by the extreme right in
order to attract voters from different areas of the political spectrum. These panies portray
themselves as the defenders of national identity and stand for a strong state and the
enforcement of law and order. They warn about the foreignization of their cultures and
see immigrants as a threat to their national identity. Extreme-right parties speak of
)<; Piefo lpu:i. ""!be SilmlCountmevolutioD Hypotbcsis. 00 d1e Ernersax:eo(utreme RighI-wins Parties
to Europ:.M Europa.o JoIU»I o(PolitieaJ Rcsardl22.1 ( 1992).
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"keeping France French", and Ven:nany for the Gennans". They also consider
immigrants responsible for the economic crises their countries are experiencing and
present them as competitors wilh the native people in a struggle for scan:c resources.
According to righi-wing extremiSls, immigrants are responsible for all that ails society.
Both the Front National and the Republikaner, employ the slogan "climinate
unemployment. stop immigration". This deep hostility directed IOwards outsiders has
made immigration the most prominent issue of the platfonns of the extreme righl.
The problem of immigration can be viewed from two different perspectives.
economic and culrural. From the economic point of view. immigrants are perceived as
competitors in times of economic recession and as a burden to the welfare system. There
is a perception among some Europeans that immigrants take jobs away from the native
population and that they also abuse the benefits of the social system. From the cultural
point of view, immigrants of non-European origin are viewed as unassimilable by their
host societies. Muslims, in particular, have been at the center of the debate of national
identity. The increasing presence of non-European immigrants has resulted in an
explosion of BCism and xenophobia among Europeans. Taking advantagc of the fears
and apprehensions permeating society concerning the presence of foreignen. the extreme
right has helped to dictate the terms in whicb the issue of immigration has been debated.
The argument of lhis lhesis is that immigration is a viable explanation for the rise
of the extreme right. The so-called problem of immigration can be understood nOl just in
terms of the number 'of immigrants but also in a major distinction of assimiiabiJity
U Harvey Simmous, The FrmdI Natioaal FrooL The uuemUt CbaUeuae to De!Doeracy. (USA: Wesrview
Press.. 1996).
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between European and non-European immigrants based on cultural differences. The
extreme righl and the immigration problem coexist in the context of a rapid social change
that has increased insecurity and instability for many people. contributing to feelings of
alienation and resenll1'lenl During the lasl two decades. advanced Western societies have
been confronted by a fundamental restructuring of their economies. changes in their
social structure and value system, and major ITanSformations of their culture. Problems
such as isolation give rise to anxiety. In order 10 resolve this anxiety. some individuals
seek and find security in cxtreme.right programs and organizations and al the same time
are predisposed to view immigrants as scapegoats.
{fwe are to tmderstand the rise of the extreme right, it is important to examine their
panics. their leadership. !heir prognrns and the context in which they appear. Also. in order
to understand the strength that these parties have obtained, it is necessary to analyze their
electoral performance and the reasons why voters suppon them. ChaptetS two and three
present the contemporary developments of Ihe extreme right in France and Getmany placed
in a historical conleXl, 6rst through a consideration of Ihe evolution of !he extreme right
from the early years of the postWar through its low pcrfonnance from the late 1950$ to Ihe
1980$ and finally the electoral success that brought the extreme right 10 life a decade ago.
Chapter four presents an explanation of the problem of immigration. its history, the
perception of immigration and national identity and the economy as well as an analysis of
the explosion of racism and xenophobia. Finally. chapter five examines Ihc success of the
extreme right at exploiting the issue of immigration, their position regarding immigrants. the
influence these parties have had in mainstream politics and the irnponance of stUdying the
rise oflhe extreme right.
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ChapterU
The extreme rigbt in France
One of the main political changes in the French political landscape since the early
19805 has been the rebirth of the extreme right. The extreme right appeared in a
momentary vacuum created by the politicaJ system. This vacuum originated due to a
substantial shift in the center of political gravity in France: the decline of the Conununist
social base, the conversion of the Socialists to the politics of rigueur and the
I1ldicalisation ofmainstream conservatism on important social issues.
The rise of the Front NationaJ since the early 19805 has led to a rightward shift in
French politics across the political spectrum. The traditiona.! right is more right than ever
before on issues such as immigration, law and order. integration and citizenship; so is the
traditional lett The rise of the extreme right has also intensified a polite form of racism
widespread in French society. Although crude forms of racism are not allowed. the form
of racist expression that the Front uses has ceased to shock: and has become accepted as a
daily pan ofFrencb social and political discourse.
Historical background
The extreme right is not a new phenomenon inF~ since the nineteenth century,
the country has experienced several cycles ofextreme-right activity. However the CORteX[ in
which it has emerged and the rhetoric of the Front National are different from its
predecessors. In the past the extreme right reflected deep divisions in French society,
particularly the inability ofCatholic and aristocratic France to R:OOIK:ile itself with a secular
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republic.. After the FraIJOl>Prussian war, radical nationalist ideas emerged as a significant
political force giving rise to several political movements during the 18905. The inter-war
period was characterized by a great increase in political violence. Owing these: years, groups
known as the Ligu.es or the Croir de Feu made headlines with tenorist acts dmcted towards
groups they considered to be differenL When the German tanks moved into France in 1940.
the National Assembly voted full powers to Marshal Petain. the 84-year old "Vietor of
Verdun" and hero of the First World War. A treaty was signed with the Nazis WKler which
the northern half of France was occupied by German uoops and the southern half was
80vemed from Vichy by Petain in an increasingJy dictatorial and collaborationist fashion.
Extreme right activists helpod him in his attempt to achieve a National Revolution. which
aimed at the spiritual regeneration of France with certainties such as vinue, patriotism.
family, pride and the right and duty to work. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the
extreme right suffered from its associations with the Vichy regime and collaboratO£$ wen:
vigorously prosecuted. According to Frea:rs, because of its ooUaboration with Vichy and the
Nazis., the extreme right "Was more isolated than evcr- before".Jf>
Forces of the extreme right began to re-cnerge after 1945. Liberation in 1944
brought a constitutional debate among the forces of the resistance and the Free French Army
led by Charles de Gaulle. General de Gaulle supponed the creation of a Presidential
Republic; instead, an Assetnbly-dominated parliamentary regime was established and de
Gaulle retired from politics. However, a Gaul/iste movement. then considered an anti-
system party. the Rassemblement de Peuple Frant;ais (RPF) was established in support of
his ideas. The RPF was built around its leader and power was concentrated in the president
.. John Freus, Parties ad voten ia France. (NY: Sl Martin·s Pra$.IDe., 1991) Ill.
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of the Rally, General de Gaulle, who originally conceived the RPF as a broad non-partisan
movement appealing to all classes and especially to workers. The raison d'etre of the
movement was constitutional reform; the rally was to mobilize members of all parties for
this essential but limited objective. Instead. it soon developed into a new party in everything
but the name. Williams assats that according to the French political tradition. the RPF was a
branch of the Booapartist stream. with some ofits characteristics including the demand for a
government with authority and passionate nationalism.:J1 The RPF also shared some features
of Fascist movements such as the simultaneous call fer national revival and social change. a
strong government, the evocation of the dignity and power of the state against the demands
ofpressure groups and sectional intc:reslS.
The most important expression of the extreme right in the 19505 was Poujadisme.
PietTe Poujade. a shop~eeper. led a local tax strike. which rapidly devek>ped into a mass
movement ofdiscontented small traders known as UOCA (Union for the Defence ofTraders
and Artisans). Poujadisme sought to go back to a simpler world where the small grocer was
not threatened by the supemwket., the small craftsman by mass production. the small fanner
by bureaucracy and taxes, and every person by the Stale. corrupt politicians and political
parties doing deals and forgetting their promises. The greatest success of the Poujat!istu
was in the 1956 election when the movement won 2.5 million votes (12.9 percent of the
poll) and 52 deputies in the French National Assembly.JS Subsequently Poujadismedeclined
rapidly. unable to contend with intemal divisions. resurgent Gaul/ism in the Fifth Republic
II Phillip M. Williams. Crisis IllId Compromise. Politics in the FOIIltb Republic, (Great Britain: Longman.
1964). Bonapartism aims 'Idlablishiog an autoen.tic: IOvemrnelU within me fl'amework ofdemoc:racy.
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and the switch from proportional representation back to a majority system. The POlljadist
phenomenon coincided with the Algerian War and preceded de Gaulle's establishment of a
presidential regime in 1958.
The context in which the extreme right operated during the earlydecadcs of the Fifth
Republic: was unfavorable. The strong presidency of de Gaulle limited the participation of
parties in the political arena, including lhose of the extrane right. The Gaulliste program
drew support from the extreme right by articulating some of its nationalist themes. Although
members of the extreme right supported de GauUe's return to power in 1958. he jailed some
of their leaders when they opposed his gnnting independence to Algeria in 1961.
The years after the Algerian war were a lean period for the extreme right. The
extreme right struggled for over two decades to make an electoral impact. In I%5 they
helped to organize the prl:Sidential campaign of Tixier-Vignanoour, former minister of
infonnarion in the Vichy government and longstanding far-right notable. After the election.
the extreme right splintered and Tixier·Vignancour created the ARLP (Alliance
Ripublicame pour fes Libertis et Progres). In 1969. a body of intellectuals. of whom Alain
de Benoist was the most prominent and effective, fonned GRECE (Groupement de
Recherche el d'ttudes pour fa Civilisation Euro"eene) to promote lhe idea of Europe
becoming a patchwork of racially distinct cultures and regiom that would supersede modem
nation states. Also in 1969, a movement called Ordn NOfL'IJeQu emerged as the principal
representative of the extreme right. Ordn Nouveau was founded by a group of militant
"Paul Hainsworth, ''The Extreme RiSht in Posl-war France: the Emeliellce and Success of the Frollt
National", The Extreme RighI in Europe and !be USA. ed. Paul Hainswonb (New York: SL Martin's Press,
1992)31.
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Fig. 2.1 Extreme right performance In the elections for the
Chambre des Deputes (1951-1997)
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"nalional revolutionaries" in response to the student movement of 1968.
During 1969 there was a growing debate within the extreme-right circles on the
need for a "new front" organization.)') The initiative in setting up the Fronl National
(FN) was taken by Ordre Nou\·eQu which wanted to use it as a parliamentary strategy to
reach a wider audience. The FN was created in 1972. Although it brought together a
heterogeneous collection of extreme-right groups, members of Ordre NOU\'eQU initially
held power. The FN spent its first ten years trying, but was unable to make any
significant impact on the political scene. Jean-Marie Le Pen led the Front during the
19705. In the 1974 French presidential election, Le Pen received only 0.8 percent of the
vote. In the 1981 presidential election, Le Pen was unable to gather the 500 signatures
from local councillors which were a condition for the nomination as an official candidate
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in that year's presidential election. However, soon afterward the party was reorganized
and began to gain strength. This is demonstrated in figure 2.1 which shows the
percentage of the vote won by parties oftbe exlmne right in legislative elections. The FN
began to take advantage of a divided and demoralised right-wing opposition and the
presence of members of the Communist party in the Socialist-led government.
The FrOllI National
Bad news for France is good news for lhe FN. As the unemployment rate has
worsened over the past fifteen years, hitting a post-Second World War high of 12.8
percent in FebNary 1997, the Front's fortunes in national and kK:aI elections have
steadily improved during the last decade..cI In 1982, the Front managed to receive 10
percent in a handful of communes in the cantonal elections (table 2.2).
The FN was especially successful in Dreux, where the FN list led by Jean-Pierre
Stirbois won 16.7 percent of the valid votes in September. By 1984 the FN was the right
party in the right place at the right time. Benefiting greatly from eloctoral success
achieved in Dreux in 1983 and media anention, the FN won I I percent of the vote in the
European election and ten of the eighty-one French seats.~l At the time of the FN's
success in the European eloction, French society had gone through a prolonged period of
malaise that began in the mid-1970s. This was caused by the economic recession.
~199S)I7.
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austerity measures imposed by the government. social tension over unemployment and
growing crime rates.
Success in the 1984 European Parliamentary elections brought funds and
supponers into the FN and the party set about organising on a national basis. The 1986
elections represented another successful moment and consolidation of the FN vote as the
pany entered, for the first time. the French National Assembly. Fran~ois Mitterrand
introduced a one-round proportional voting system for the parliamentary elections of
1986 only. During this election. the Front National was able to achieve 35 seats.
TIlb/~ 22 ElectDNIl pufOmlllnce oftJrr Front NtJtionll1 brpn-erlftllgr ofthe vote
1973
1974
1978
1981
'913
'9"1985
19..
'9"
'9"1992
1993
1994
PresidMtial
(l-. round)
0.8
14.4
0.8
0.3
9.6
9.6
12.5
ClUItonal MlUficipal
0.1
8.8
5.3
2.1
12.2
9.8
European
Parliament
11.0
11.7
10.5
1995 15.0
1997 14.9
6.7
Sollrc~: L~ mo"d~. IIQrious ootU lIS P'U~rrl~ by Harvry SimmalU. T1I~ Frmclr NatiOllQf Front (/996).
° Fitstballot
Two years later the President dissolved me National Assembly and called new
parliamentary elections with the traditional two-round majority system. Under !his
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system candidales must receive at least l2.S pen:eDl in the first round in order to contest
the second round (as a result. the Front was left with only one seat in the parliament).
One of the most. important successes for the FN came with the presidential election of
1988; Le Pen anracted 14.4 percent of the vote. Also. the local elections of 1989 marked
a new electoral trend in favour of the extreme right; the Front received 42.S percent of the
vOle in Dreux and 33 percent in MarseilJe.42
The year 1995 marlted the consolidation of the FN as a national electoral force.
Le Pen had a strong showing in the presidential COniest in April, emerging from the first
round of voting with a just over IS percent of the votes cast He failed 10 win a place in
the second ballot but was only three points behind the Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur.
and five points behind Jacques Chine. who was the front-runner on the right. One of the
centtal themes in Le Pen's campaign was the allegation of corruption against mainstream
politicians (from both the left and right). Le Pen claimed that all the three main
conlenden (Balladur. Chirac and Jospin) were social democrats. while he was the only
aulhentic popular candidate. Another issue that figured in Le Pen's rhetoric was the
concept of national prefennu. He proclaimed that there should be two social security
systems: the firsl for French cilizens, the second a son of residual system. for (/rose
foreignen allowed to remain in France, paid for from their own contributions. Le Pen
insisted that inunigrants either caused unemployment by taking jobs from French people,
or were unable to find jobs, being thus a burden to the state. Le Pen also explained that he
C P. Brttboa. aDd sx.. Mitra., 1'bt' National Frolll &:l Fl'UlCc. The~ lIe &.II Extreme-riSlll Prolest
MOvetl1elll~,Cll!!JlU!!ive Politics 25.1 (I992) 70.
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was commined to the creation of four million new jobs. One and quaner million jobs
would come from the repatriation of immigrants.·3
In the municipal elections. the FN put forward 2S.000 candidates. some 10.000
more than in 1989. The party concentrated its efforts in the larger urban centers.
especially those in its traditional azeas of support such as northern France. the east. the
area around Paris and the Mediterranean littoral. In the tim round the FN obtained 10
percent or more of the vote in over 100 towns with a population of more than 30.000. It
also passed the threshold to go through the second ballot in 21 districts in Paris. Lyon and
Marseilles.'" Bruno Megret obtained the Front's most spectacular score in Vitrolles with
over 43 percent; the FN also headed the poll in Dreux, Marignane and Toulon. A
considerable amount of the media's attention was set on Vitrolles and Dreux. According
10 Marcus., this may have been a powerful element in encouraging voters to oppose the
FN. Its successes came elsewhere. in Toulon. Marignane and Ontnge. Toulon is a city of
183.000 inhabitants. and thus, a significant political prize. The Socialist candidate had
remained in the race during the second ballot thus dividing the opposition against the
local Front leader Jean-Marie Le Chevalier. In Marignane. with 32,000 inhabilants. the
FN obtained 37 percent of the popular vote against the mainstream right. In Orange. with
a population of 27,000 inhabitants, the FN headed by Jacques Bompard. obtained nearly
36 percent of me vote.·s
In Vitrolles, seemingly the pany's best hope for victory, Bruno Megret clearly
suffered from the improved turnout and the Socialist mayor Jean~JacquesAnglade was
<1 Mucus, The Nl.tio~1 Front, 307.
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re-elected. However, during the municipal elections held in February 1997, Catherine
Megtet was officially elected mayor of Vitrolles. She defeated Anglade by winning 52.48
percent of the vote in the second round of the election. This was the first time in the FN's
history that a candidate achieved an absolute majority. In 1983, two yean after F~ois
Mitterrand was elected France's fIrst Socialist president, the people of Vitrolies elected a
Socialist mayor. About 20,000 people were living there at the time, there were very few
immigrants and Wlemployment was almost unknown. Today, Vitrolles is a IOwn of
40,000, many of whom are immigrants or descendants of immigranls from Arab North
Africa. About 40 percent of the population is under the age of twenty-five and the rate of
joblessness is one and a halftimes the national average.
TheFN's power base in the South is finn. A total of30outof39lown councilors in
Vitrolles are now supportctS of Le Pen's party. The FN is slowly building support in the
Provence-AJpes-C6te d'Azur region with 30 representatives out of 123 on the regional
council. In the deporrement of Bouches du RhOne, including Vitrolles, there are now
between 140 and 150 elected Le Pen supporters across 119 conununes. There is at least one
FN representative in seven sectors of Marseille, and in the eighth, the poorest part of the
city, there are two. The dipartemenl ofthe Vax. which is made up of 153 communes, has 73
FN elected membc:rs of whom 41 make up the majority ofme town colIDCiI in Toulon. The
five most important to\llOS in the Alpes Maritimes have a total of nine Franl National
elected members, twO in Nice. three in Cannes, two in Menton and two in Antibes.4() During
the 1997 Parliamentary elections the FN garnered almost 15 pen::ent of the votes in the first
&J Mucu$.. The National ffOllt. 312.
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round of the election and the patty also gained electoral importance when 133 FN
candidates made it into the second round. However, during the second round the FN entered
the National Assembly with only one seat. Jean-Marie Le Chevallier, mayor ofToulon, was
elected in the tim constituency ofVar with 52 percent orthe vote against 48 percent for the
SociaJisl: candidate.
One of the most importanl acbieverneuts in the histoty of the FN has been its
electon! perfonnance in Ihe mwricipality ofDrewt. Less than aD hour away from Paris., the
town maries the passage from the lle-de·France region into Normandy. Located at Ihe
junction of three river valleys. those of the Aure.lhe Eure and the Blaise., Oreux is a modcsl
town. a subprcfecture of the Eure-et-Loir dipaTtement. By French standards., Dreux ranks as
a mediwn-sized city, boasting slightly more than 30.000 inhabiWlts. For over 15 years,
Drewt became a political laboratory for the extreme right. The FN in Orewt was able 10
develop a winning formula combining good constituency work with its anti-immigration
theme. Its tim success came in the canlOnal elections of 1982 when the Front won 12.6
percent of the vote in Dreux West and 9.6 in Dreux East, levels that had been rarely
achieved elsewhere by the patty.•7 During the 1983 elections, the FN argued that the
presence of too many immigrants in Dreux was the cause of high unemployment,
delinquency, and the breakdown ofpublic order. problems. which according to the FN could
be eliminated by the reversal of the high level of immigration. In this election, the left won
40.5 percent.. the moderate-right 42.8 percent and the FN 16.7 percent. The town became a
strong base of support when in the European elections of 1984 the FN won 19.1 percent of
the vote in Dreux. In the presidential election of 1988 Le Pen received 21.8 percent of the
vote in the area, but only 17.9 percent in the legislative elections that followed (fig. 2.3).
Fig. 2.3 FN's performance In Dreux and at the National
level
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In 1989 Marie-France Stirbois received 22.2 percent of the vote in the municipal
elections, indicating further reinforcement of the FN's position in the area; in the next
Senate election, Slirbois came in first with 42.5 percent of the vote.48 In the first round of the
municipal elections of 1995, Stirbois obtained 35 percent of the popular vote. However,
durin&; the second ballot left-wing voters rallied behind the mainstream right's list to defeat
Madame Stirbois. In the last legislative election, Stirbois lost to Gerard Hamel, mayor of the
city, who obtained 58 percent of the vote against 41 percent of the candidate of the FN.49
"Brechon,72.
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09 Results pubhshed in L'Humanne (French Communist daily) June 2, 1997.
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Jean-Marie Le Pen
An important elemenl conlributing to the success of the FN is undoubtedly the
presence of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his charismatic appeal. He has been eminently
successful in gaining attention for his party. When !he pany gained its first electoral
successes during lhe early 19805, it was Le Pen who personified its message. and it was
his rhetoric thai, in large pan.. gained the party a following. Le Pen and lhe FN have
become so closely associated Ihat it is difficult to imagine Ihe party without its
charismatic leader.
In the classic manner of extreme-right organisations. the leader. the man of
desliny, is at lhe core of the FN.so Le Pen is the embodiment of the FN, its symbol and
focal porn!. As in the case of many charismatic leaders. Le Pen is expected to be larger
than life and his followers may well fccl that ordinary standards do not apply. The
peBOnai role of Le Pen in the rise of the FN cannot be overestimated. According 10
Marcus, he has been the ~fat-right's equivalent of de GauJ1e~.'1 The events of Le Pen's
tife have been carefully packaged by the FN to present the image of a man from humble
origins.. who after fighting for his counuy in the ResiStanCe and in lndo-China, became its
youngest parliamentary deputy and then wenl on 10 volunteer for military service in
Algeria.
The son and grandson of sailors. Jean·Marie Le Pen was born in 1928 in Brittany.
heartland of Catholic traditionalism. At the age of nineteen. after graduating from a Jesuit
school in Brittany, he enrolled in the Paris Law Faculty, traditionally a centre of extreme-
lOFys.h,J20.
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righl agitation. During his time in the Faculty, Le Pen's debating skills and energy helped
him to become vice·president and then president of the Corps de Droit, a right.wing
faction of the UNEF (Union Nationaledes Eludiants Fran~is). Le Pen spent much of his
time propagandising for the UNEF. debating and quarrelling with fellow right-wing
studenlS, and brawling in demonstJations and.street haRles against the left.l2 In 1953 he
volunteered to serve in Indochina with the Foreign Legion as a parachutist. Elected in a
working-class constituency in January, 1956, he rapidly gained a reputation for the
effcetiveness of his oratory.
The political ph.ilosophy of the FN is largely reducible to Le Pen's writings and
speeches. He is widely held 10 be a Ialented demagogue with great debating skills and a
keen understanding of television technique. However, within his own following he is
taken seriously as an original thinker.
The leadership principle is the key to the FN's structure. The party insists upon
rigid internal discipline and loyalty 10 the line pursued by its president, Jean-Marie le
Pen.'J In the FN there is almost a cult of personality centred on Le Pen. He has been
capable of binding together the disparale forces of the extreme right under his personal
leadership. Vaughan asserts that the founder of the FN could be considered "exemplary- 10
the extent that his background fits all the stereotypes of the extreme right".S4 Because of
Le Pen's leadership, the FN has been successful in riding out the risks of splits within the
party. The FN has developed a fronust strue1Ure that allows the existence of different
tendencies in the party. The most imponant tendencies are represented in the bureau
IlSinvnolu.l2.
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politique. which includes royalists, Catholic integralists. Solidaristes, ex-collaborators
and the Nouvelle Droite. Each of these tendencies has its own doctrines and in some
cases its own newspapers and magazines. However. they all recognise Le Pen as the
undisputed leader of the movement.
Although Le Pen has played an important role in the success of the Front
National, it has been the issue of immigration that has gained the party a following. As in
other European democracies. the extreme right has made its gains at a time of change in
party politics. In that respect the extreme right in France shares the same characteristics
that the extreme right in Gennany. In both situations the success of the extreme right has
been made possible by the political opportUnities that have been opened up by
mainstrearnpartic:s.
S< Vaughan. "'The Extreme Right in FtallCe". 217.
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Chapterm
The extreme rigbt in Germany
The problem of the recent. violent expansion of rigtu-wing extremisl: activily is not
unique to Germany. Still, right-wing extremist activities in the Federu Republic are viewed
with a special distrust and usuaIJy arouse sensitive reactions from foreign as weU as from
Gennan observers. This is due, in part, to Germany's Nazi past and concerns regarding the
slabilily of post-reunification German democracy. It is small wonder that the electoral
success of the RepubliJw.ner has produced not only a wave of protest demonstrations. but
also of media reports. conferences and publications dealing with this party.
The increase in extreme right radicalism in Gemwty has oceurred in a time of
change in post-war party politics. "The German electorate has shown itself more willing than
in the pasllo support new political parties or change established preferences. The emergence
of the Green Party as an alternative undescored the exhaustion of post war democratic
politics. Support for the Greets demonstrated the public's desire for new alternatives in
party politics. lbis opening up of the process created an opportunily for other groupings to
seek electoral support, especially on the extreme right ofthe political spectrum.
During the 19805 and early 19905 politics and politicians faced a crisis of
confidence. The percentage of the popular vote that the large parties received has declined
steadily. Both main political parties. the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
(CDUlCSU) and Social Democratic party (SPD) have lost electoral support. The established
parties have relied on coalitions with small parties.. normally the Free Democratic Party
(FOP) and tended to be oriented towards the center. However. during the past decade the
"
composition of coalitions has become less predictable because small parties (such as the
Gm:ns) ~ taking a larger share of the vote. Because suppon for the FOP has been
declining and smaller parties such as the Greens have emerged, coalition oppommities are
prone to arise quickly for newcomer parties including those ofthe extreme right.
HurorifXjl background
Right-wing extremism has been a constant element in the history ofGennany. Until
1945 nationalist and anti-democt2tic parties were the dominant political forces in Germany.
During Imperial Germany they constituted the national co.mp and were aligned with the
autocratic and militarist government of the day. In the Weimar Republic. such parties
proved strong enough 10 destroy democracy. The Natio1lO./sozialutische DeuIsche
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) achieved small electoral successes in 1928, but by 1932 it had
become the most powerful party in the country. On January 30, 193] Adolf Hitler was
proclaimed Chancellor of the Reich. National SociaJism abolished democratic institutions
and elevated nationalism 10 the rank ofofficial state ideology.
As a result oftheSec:ood World War. Germany fell under strict control of the allied
forces. They divided the territory into zones of occupation and supervised the creation of a
new political system based on democratic institutions. The Allied Control CoWlCil.
developed to coordinate occupation policy efforts, iniriated Conuol Council Law Number
Two in October 1945. This law was specifically designed to terminate and liquidate all Nazi
organizations. The program resulting from this law became known as deneuijico.non. All
Nazi institutions, including paramilitary organizations, were made illegal and any attcrnpt at
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developing any Icind of organization supporting Nazi ideology was strictly forbidden. As a
result of the tknazifiaHion program.. the NSDAP and its subsidiary organizations as well as
posstllie successorsw~ banned. and all soci~politicaJ activities were subject !O a licensing
requirement and continuous strict control. It was evident that parties. Lmions, associations
and interest groups could only become active with permission, and at lim the occupying
powers only licensed such activities at the local and regional levels. Political panies were
only granted a license if they could prove that their manifesto was anti-Fascist and that their
politicians were not fonner Nazis.'s The Cold Warresulled in the partition of Germany. The
three Western zones were brought together and allowed to establish a 1ibera1 democratic
regime. The founders of the new regime were concerned 10 prevent a fragmentation of the
party system by encouraging a few promising parties.
The Bonn Basic Law, a lemporary Constitution. specified the rights and duties of
political parties and contained provisions which allowed the German High Coon to ban
antidemocratic parties. One of the provisions included in the 1953 electoral law was the fil.'I!
percent clause. According to this. only those political parties who have obtained al least five
percent of the popular vote or three constituency seats can be represenled in the: lower
chamber ofthe national parliament (Bundestag).
The Allies mistrusted the German people. Public opinion polls showed a Gennan
unwillingness to reject Nazism completely and there seemed 10 be good conditions for a
nee-Fascist revival. International vigilance against the recurrence of extreme.right polilics in
Europe focused primarily on Gmnany. The occupation policy of the Western Allies was
aimed not only to the elimination of Nazism and militarism bul also to the reconstruction of
"SlOSS. Polirie$ agai!ut dernoaxy. 84.
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poJiticallife on a democratic basis. Hence. me Allies did not only have to prevent supponcrs
of National Socialism from gaining influence in post·war Germany. but they also had 10
ensure that Ihe problems of the post·wac period did nol escalate inlo broad dissatisfaction
with the political status quo and develop inlo a breeding ground for a new right-wing;
extremism.S6 The Allied powers had very diffem!t views about how fac they could go with
denazification. tempered in any case by the need. argued first by the British. later accepted
by the Americans and the French, to reann the Germans against the Soviet Union. There
was agreement on Ihe need for a stable regime and the desirability of excluding non-
democratic parties.
However. the inability of the allied occupation authorities and the new German
government to totally denazify Gennany led to a reestablishment of righi-wing interests
during the early post-wac yean. Parties oftbe extreme right emerged during the first decade
following the wac. They primarily profited from the consequences of the social. political and
economic problems of thai period. These parties, however. tended 10 split each year. The
number of parties of the extreme right increased steadily from two in 1945 to twelve in
1951. By 1952, the number of parties of both the right and left increased to seventy-four.
Interest in the extremist parties began to diminish in 1957 and continued 10 attract Iinle
anention through 1959.S'
Jo Some of the problems refer 10 the division ofGamany. the hordes of expeUea aod rcfuCtt$ wbo wetc:
stIUmiD& mto the 1bcft WeAenl ZOIle$ rmm the East, the muses ofpcople who bad bttu. tx.nbedOUl. die:
~Ioyed and me swvin& as weU u tbo$e subjtttc:d 10 dDftaiJkIUion.
11 Rand C. l.cwi5. A Nui Lepcy. RighI_wiDg Extremism in Posl:-wu Germany. (New York: Prxger.
1991)41.
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Extreme-right panies were successful at the regional and local level, but with a few
regionally concentrated exceptions, they never had an impressive electoral perfonnance.
Flg.3.1 e.lreme,lghlpe,fo,m,neelneleetlon.forlhe
Bunde.t.gl""'·1 ....}
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Sowu Woh1:um Dftludlen Bundestag om 1JJollllor 1987. 19-11
I WAV:niDRP(l949-1961)
2NPD(I96~I987)
) Rqdlli1uner(I990-1994)
Winschafiliche Aufbau-Vereinigung CtNAV) won seats in 1946 and 1949 and the Deutsche
Rechtsparrei (DRP) did it in 1949. The Deutsche Reichsparrei (DRP) was founded in 1950
by a variety of national conservative and neo·Nazi organizations. It entered the Land
parliaments in Lower-Saxony in 1951 and 1955, and the Rltineland-Palatinate in 1959 (Fig.
3.1).
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The years between 1953 and 1961 have been referred to as the Mdoldtums yearsMof
right-wing extremism.51 Indeed, the wave of nationalisl sentiment. which had become
apparent during the early pJSI-war~ had abnosr. completely subsided by 1953. The
consolidation of the domestic and foreign policy of West Germany ensured the growing
stabilization of the politicaJ order and formed a barrier to the success of anti-democrntic
parties. Frngmentation. organizational and personal rivalries and social isolation became
chanlcteristic of the nationalist oPfKlSition. It was not until 1966 that the extreme right
experienced a new upturn. This was the creation of the NanonaJdenwkTatische Partei
Deurschl4nd (NPD). Under the leadership of Adolf van Thadden, the NPD succeeded in
recruiting up to 33,000 members and won seats in seven Lmmder partiamems between 1966
and 1968. In the federal election of 1969, the NPD achieved the best result an extreme-right
party had obtained since 1949 when it gained 4.3 percent of the popular vote. Initially, the
NPD did not have an autonomous manifesto or a unifomt party ideology. Their diffuse
conglomerar:ion of demands was an expression of "inner-party heterogeneity which was
consolidated by organizational growth....S'J They were concerned to achieve an external
image ofbeing nationalist~tive and faithful to the Constitution. in order (0 avoid a
poss1bleban.
The second halfofthe 1970$ and the first half of the 19805 were a dismal period for
panics of the extreme right. As the German economy strengthened in the early 19705. the
influence of the right-wing and in particular the NPD began a downward trend in popular
suppon. This would eventuaIly bring the party to near extinction in the late 19705. However.
ill Stl!5s. PoliJk;s APlI!SI Democncy,127.
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during the late 1980$ a number of developments helped to create an atmospbere in which
extreme-rigbt parties rouJd suc:ceed These were unemployment. the continuing influx of
foreigners seeking political asylum or simply work in West Gennany, and the migration of
ethnic Germans and citizens of the German Dremocratic Republic to the Federal Republic. In
1989 the extreme righl scored its biggest success since the 1960s. 1be: RepubliJuzner, a new
organization on the right. won 7.5 percent afthe votes in the West Berlin election to caprure
eleven seats in the local parliament.
The RepubliJuzner
The RepubliJcaner party was founded in 1983 by Franz Handlos, Ekkehar Veigt.
(dissidents of the CSU, the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU) and Franz Schoenhuber. The
name of the party was to symbolize its affinity to a Reagan-style nationalist conservatism.
paired with cultural conservatism and anti-Communist rhetoric.tO The party developed roots
primarily in Bavaria, but also created subsidiaries in Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. lis hard
~ was primarily drawn from the organizations ofexpeUees and COU party activists.
In 1983 ScbOnhuber look over the position of national chainnan. Despite further
Stnlggies within the party and criticism ontis authoritarian leadershlp, he held that position
for almost fifteen years. SchOnhuber, a native of Bavaria., had spenl the years following the
war drifting from one political party to another. He had supported the NSOAP in the 19305
and 19405. In the post-war period he became a newspaper editor in Munich.~1 Following
the war, he then joined the SPO, the German party that was traditionally supportive of
""Kil$C:belt,216.
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Socialist programs and which was antithetical to the ideologies of Nazism. After a short
stint., SchOnhuber then moved to the conservative CSU. By the mid-1980s he had rennned to
the extreme right and became a spokesman for the party. From 1975 to 1982 he was the host
of a popular political talk show on Bavarian lelevision. In 1982 he was fired from his post
because of the publication of his autobiography in which he boasted of his S5 background.
Like the French FN leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. 5cMnhuber is a skilful and demagogic
speaker. He survived many powersauggles within the party. and was always careful 10 keep
right.wing extremist materials out of the party program.62 The public position of
SchOnhuber had been German nationalist, exploiting discontent about the alleged
breakdown of law and order, and the influx offoreignen and ethnic Germans.
The poticy proposals and propaganda of the Republikaner fit all lhe characteristics
of an extreme-right party. However, the Republilcaner consider itself righi-wing. In their
statute, they distance themselves from any extremist party; as SlOSs noles, "no one may
become a member of the party Die Republikaner who belongs to or suppons an
unconstitutional or-ganizarion or a left-wing or right-wing extremist group".") The party
views itself as a constitutionaJ and democratic party finnly commined to the German
Constitution and the maintenance of law and order. The Office for the Prolection of the
Constitution, the domestic government intelligence agency. does not include the
Republikaner in its yearly listing ofleR and right wing extremist panies. Officially. they are
described as right-wing radical, hence belonging 10 the democratic spectrum. The
Republikaner have been more skilful than other radical right-wing panies in attempting 10
t.lBnlll1thal99.
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portray tbc:mselves as a legitimate party prepared to operate within the constitutional
struetuTe. Kitschelt and McGann argue that the program of the Republikaner is different
from that of other European parties of the extreme right and shows some manifestations of
National Socialism in the particular case oflhe extreme right in Gennany.6ol
The party platform adopted by the RepubliMne:r in 1987 has antidemocratic.
nationalist and anti-European tendencies.. The party espouses racism. nationalism and a
quest for law and order. II employs a vocabulary that is close to National-Socialist rhetoric.
especially through the usage of terms such as Volk (folk). Deuuches Volk and Lebensraum
(living space). Party programs demand the protection of the environment as a means of
saving the soil and calion women to nurture a family and children at home. Women are said
to have a :special vocation and duty to crea1e a climate of security through warmth and
devotion in which family and chikirm can thrive. Although acknowledging that women
have the right to education and a qualified job training in order for them to gain
independence and self-esteem, the Republikaner stress the necessity to give women the
opportunity to fully develop their natUral ability as mothers and centers of the family.
Directly and indim:t.ly, the party employs hate messages and social stereotypes. The
Republilcaner follow the foowe:ps of their precursors from DRP to NPD, with whom lhey
have in common an authoritarian and nationalist view of the social order that also is wary of
free market capilalism.u With regard 10 the political order of Germany, the Republikaner
support the concept ofan authoritarian state with the intention of its strengthening as a factor
"K.iBcbelt.I04.
"'Kiucbelt. 218.
of control. and view the organizations and institutions of political decision-making with
mistrust and aim to reduce their influence.66
In socio-political terms, the Rqmbliktmel' project lhemselves as the party of the
"linle people", of the man in the street. a party of those "'worried about their economic
existence and seeking social protection from the vagaries of the market place".1>7 The refonn
of social order for which they strive is to be achieved, they claim. by means of a change in
consciousness, and the "feeling of all working people living together must be created"./ol
The Republi/canu m openly anti-European and inherently anti-American. Oosely
related [Q their anti-American feelings is the Repubfihm.er's continuing political agitation
against the way the history of Germany and the world has been wrinen since 1945.
especially the alleged reorientation ofthe German people by the allied powers.
Support for the RepubliJcanu
Although the RqJubliJcaner have not been as successful as the Front National in the
electoral arena, the party has managed to achieve small gains at the local level and is still
within Germany the largest and most influential party of the extreme right. The
ReplibliJcanu gained suppon in the Land elections in Bavaria with 3.6 percent in 1986.
During 1987 they gained 1.2 percent in Bremen and in 1988 they achieved only 1.2 pert:ent
of the vote in Baden-Wurttcmberg and 0.6 percent in Schleswig-Holstein. In the same year,
the NPD and OVU were able to achieve a combined voter share of 3.4 percent in the
Bremen parliamentary election. During 1989 the Repubfikallf!l' scored their greatest success
"St6ss,20J.
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when in January they won 6 percent of the popular vote. This percentage gave the party 11
seats in the Berlin legislature. In June of the same year, the Republiko.ner entered the
European Parliament with six MEPs and 7.1 percent of the vote. During lhis election the
RepuhliJumv scored highest in Bavaria. especially in the region of the Alps where 15
percent of the vote:n supported them; they also did well in the areas of Baden-
Wurnemberg.""
Tdle 1.1 El«ttmll per{onIUUIU o(dte Republiluuter
Elections Year % Elections Year %
LilnderP"rlilJnu!flt Saarland 1990 3.5
Bavaria 1986 3.0 North Rhine-Westphalia 1990 1.8
B<em<n 1987 12 Lower Saxony 1990 I.S
Baden-Wurnemberg 1988 1.0 H.... 1991 1.7
Scb.leswig-Holstein 1988 0.6 Rhineland-Palatinate 1991 2.0
Berlin (West) 1989 1.5 Hamburg 199\ 2.0
Bavaria 1990 4.9 Baden-Wumemburg 1992 12.0
BUfldestlJ 1990 2.1 Euro elJII PlJr!ilJment
1994 1.9
Sourer: rraIMillurry!orlllr""rrtOr
1989 7.1
1994 1.9
Local elections in March and June in 1989 resulted in similar gains for the
Repilblilwnu in Rhineland Palatinate and the Saar region.. During the same election, lhe
NPD and D¥U anained only 1.6 percent of1he vole nationwide.
In the Bavarian Land elections in October, 1990 the Repllblikaner narrowly
missed representation with 4.9 percent of the vote. During the same year, they obtained
3.5 percent share of the electorate in the Saarland parliamentary elections, which
"'sloss, Polities Anizul I?cmogxy. 204.
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represented a significant drop from the 5.8 percent they had gathered in that Stale only six
months earlier in the race for lhe European parliament. Similarly. during the spring
legislative election in North Rhine-Westphalia. the Republi1caner won only 1.8 percent of
the vote and 1.5 percent in Lower Saxony. In the first Bundestag election held in
December, 1990 after unification.. the Republi1cane,. gathered 2.1 percent of the votes
nationwide. Once again. their stronghold was Bavaria where they received 5 percent of the
vote. At the time of the Bundeslag election, Berliners were called to vote for the first all-
Berlin legislature.. Unlike their previous success. the Republikmru lost their seats in the local
parliament when the party obtained only 3.1 pen:ent of the vote. This downward. trend
continued in the Land parliamentary elections held during the first half of 1991. The
Republi1caner received 1.7 percent in Hesse, 2 percent in Rltineland-Palatinate and 2
percent in Hamburg.'o On the contrary, the OVU received renewed attention when in
September, 1991 it scored well in the Bremen Land assembly election receiving more
than 6 percent of the vote whicb represented six seats in the legislative assembly. The
electoral perfonnance of the RqJublilwnu seemed to improve when they won more than
12 percent of the vote in the 1992 election in Baden-Wurttember"g, making them the third
largesl party in the area. During the local elections in Berlin that year and in Hesse in the
spring of 1993, the RepubliMner obtained more than 8 percent of the vote. In Frankfurt,
together with the OVU and the NPO, the Republikane,. won marc than 13 percent of the
vote. The Republikaner's share in Frankfurt was 9.3 percent but they won as much as 33
percent in parts of some working-class districts and had ten seats in the city parliament.
10HUI$'~ Vem. Norbert Lcpuy aDd hla Mnieb. The RmubliJcaner P:!!ty iD Gmrwly. Rip.{-wins
Rcsiswlcc or PTotest Croteh-all? (WashiD&IM D.C.: Plaqer, 1993) 8.
..
However. in the state elections in Hamburg in September. 1993 and in Lower Saxony in
March. 1994 ooce more. they failed to clear the five percent hwdle." During the 1994
Bundestag election. the Repub/iktmer failed to enter the parliament when they obtained
only 1.9 percent of the vote.
Studies reveal that a basic characteristic of the Repubiihmer constituency is its low
level of education. Among Repub/ikaner sympathizers. 71 percent have completed only the
minimum required schooling. At the time of the European election in 1989. the nwnber of
Republikaner supporters who had completed not more than first level education far
exceeded those with higher or university degrees. A swvey conducted by the AJlensbach
Institute between Marcl1 and August. 1989 found 7S percent of Republikaner sympathizers
to have completed not more than compulsory education (compared to SS percent of the
sample).n This was considerably higher than among CDUlCSU supporters and even higher
than among supporters oftbe SPD. According to Vec:n, in 1989 those aged 18·24 with more
years of schooling than the minimum required. constituted only 4 perc~t of the pool of
potential Republikaner voters. compared with their 9 percent share of the ovenll population.
On the other hand. individuals in the same age group who have completed only the
minimum required schooling were over-represented in the pool of potential Republi/w.ner
voters (9 percent versus S percent for the entire population). n
The label male party is reflected in all Republikaner election results. The
Republilcaner have almost the same difficulties attracting women as winning voters under 40
11 BeIZ, Radicl1 Right-wing, 147.
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who have acquired man: than the minimwn required schooling in the last 20 years.ll In the
elections for the European Parliammt in 1989. the RqJUbliJ:anu anracted almost as twice as
many male voters as female voters (9.6 percent versus 4.9 percent).15 SfUdies that break
down RepubliJa:urer supporters by occupation consistently show that blue-collar workers an:
ove.-.represented among Republikzner voters. The percentage of fanners and other self·
employed voters in lhe potential Republikmrer pool is also considerably higher than lheir
percentage in lhe population at large. In the Berlin election of 1989 the party did well in
worlcing-class districts. especially in areas containing numerous low--cost housing projects.7t,
According to political analysts. young and first time voters have shown a strong
leaning toward the RepubJifwner. In the 1992 election in Baden.Wurnemberg. for example.
lhe Republikanu received 18.6 percent of me vote from VO!crs younger than 25. which was
70 percent higher than their overnlJ proportion of the vote (II pen:ent).n The AlienJooc"
survey also foWld a higher percentage of party supporters from the working class for the
Republikanu than for any othe'" party. Support from skilled workers accounted for one third
of lhe total of the RepubliJ:aner support. another fifth came from unemployed and
semiskilled woric:ers. According 10 an official analysis of Hamburg·s Statistical Office.
during the 1993 state election. born the Repu.blikanu and nyu made their biggest gains in
ttaditional working-class arns, characterized by lower lhan average levels of education.
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high wu:mploymc:nt and a lower than average standard of living.11 In the state election of
Baden-Wurttemberg. the RepubiifDn~attracted 17 percent ofUDemployed V()(cn.
The RepublikIurer have also been able to establish a linn and broad base of support
inside sections of the Slate apparatus like the police and armed fon:es.. According to the
official Report of the EID"Ope3I1 Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into Racism and
Xenophobia in Europe, published in 1991, surveys suggest that support for the RepublikDnv
among policemen is especially strong. Members of the police force, allegedly disappointed
with the government's leniency towards fonner terrorists and their perceived indecision in
maners of law and order figure strongly among RepublikDner voters and members.
Policemen have voted for a party that stands for law and order. They consider themselves
scapegoats for governmental policies such as the building of nuclear power plants. lbis
policy has sparked massive protest demonstrations and clashes with the police. Moreover,
many of those policemen are originally from conservarive rwaI areas but serve in large
cities. In Bavaria, more than 50 percent of policemen declared their support for the
Republikmu while in Hessen more than 60 percent of officers expressed similar loyalties.
In addition. me RepubliJcDnv now have serious backing in the Federal Republic's armed
forces with more than one thousand serving soldiers and officers in party membership.79
Nea.Nazism
The 19705 and 19805 were years in which the right-wing extremists drifted away
from the established parties and joined clandestine radical groups. These organizations. the
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most militant oCthe extreme right are referred to as nec>Nazis. Originally formed by former
National Socialists, the networlc of extra parfiameotary right-wing extremism bas become
the politicallnining ground for nec>Nazis.. "'the post-war newcomers to the right".10 In the
rise of neo-Nazism remnants of past ideologies and contemporary prolest polentia! come
together. Neo-Nazism demonstrales a rejection of Ute democratic consensus. Among lhe
young and educa1ed. neo-Nazism has become a small but volatile protest culture on lhe
righl. They make use of Nazi language. symbols., fragments of ideology such as anti-
Semitistn, xenophobia and a leadership cull. Neo-Nazis have tried to incorporate images of
the past Nazi triumphs in order to give themselves a sense of credibility in modem posI-war
Germany. Leadership provides a sense of tradition. and an ideology that was designed 10
attract those who wanted to see Germany returned to its once prominent position of power in
central Europe. During the late 1970s militant extremist organizations became more evident.
The following groups began to come to the attention of the German legal syslem:
AlcriollSgemei/1Schafi Nationaler Sazialistt!1l, led by Michael Kuhnen; Deu1sche
AA:1iOllSgruppe led by Manfred Roeder, Wehnpongruppen Hoffman, led by Karl-Heinz
Hoffman. and the Volkssozialistisdte Bewegung DeuuchlaJltUlPonei der A,rbeit, a group of
120 members that called for a youth front led by Friedheim Busse. II
1be key 10 the potential of these groups to develop a following revolved arotmd lhe
potential insecurities associated with domestic economics. As unemployment increased,
neo-Nazis anempted 10 assume the role of fighlefS for better working conditions and job
"Gnemc: Atk.insoD.. "Gennany: Naliooalisln, Narismand Viol£nc£~,RxistVioleD«inE~,£d.Tore
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.. Eva Kolinsky, ~ C!wI&£ llOO PolineaJ Culnue in Well: Gmnany~, Politic:al Cu.lnue in
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opportunities.·~ They used the traditional Nazi slogans in order to provide the reason for the
German problems associated wilh recession. Some of me Germans who had been directly
affected by me recession became interested in what the extremists wm saying.
it is in the new states of the Federal Republic that neo-Nazism has spread the most.
As a result ofGerman unification. fonner eastern Germans experienced high unemployment
and uncertainty about future job prospects during the transfonnation of a command
economy imo a free--market economy. This was accentuated by a lack of orientation and
social dislocation among the population. Radicalization., then. came as a response to those
uncertainties.U Nco-Nazism had always existed under the GDR. Groups of neo·Nazis wen:
very active in recruiting among their activists former mem~ of the Communist pany. An
explanation for the susceptibility of easterners to extreme-right tendencies has~ found in
some aspects of their fonner ideology. Under the Communist regime. East Germans were
exonerated from their Nazi past The govenunent of the GDR considered the experience of
National Socialism a result of capitalism and denied the responsibility of its citizens for the
atrocities commined by the Nazis....
Adhenmts of neo-Nazism tend to belong to social groups who have been hit
especially hard by Wlemployment Many are unskilled or semj·skilled. Those who
completed apprenticeship tend to work as artisans in small businesses. a sector !hat has
traditionally been close to the right The dominant membership of neo.Nazi groups has been
made up of younger. less educated people who tend to be labourers. Often these people are
"l.t;wil.99.
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not equipped with the skills necessary to compete in the modern high technology indUSU'ies
that are prevalent in Germany, The inability 10 obtain suitable employment. and a sense of
being displaced by foreigners. has pushed many of these young people to radicalism and
into Ihe more militant neo-Nazi organizations. They are susceptible to the emotional slogans
and facile answers provided by the neo-Nazi leaders. who symbolize authority. suppon and
stability.1j On me extrelnNighl. with its emphasis on manhood and leadership.
unemployment is experienced more directly as a defeat. and as a fundamental loss of stalUs
and personal dignity. In both circwnstances. "radicalization follows disappointmenC.l/l
Uncertainty has left a special mark on desperate. frustrated and less·educated young men
who often come from broken homes. Many angry youth who had grown up in me
conununist era have viewed themselves in the post-unification period as second-class
citittns in relation 10 the West Germans, As compensation. "they attempt to make life
miserable fOf" the defenseless foreigners".'" Generally. there is a materialist base for neo-
Nazism activism. in the sense of economic fiu.stralions consoquent upon the state of the
economy, However. there are also personal experiences involved such as parental problems
and difficulties of various sorts at school and work. Husbands argues thai such
circumstances influence the decision of young males to resott 10 "political soldiering and
away from a conventional career palh"," This has led in some cases to feelings of social
exclusion. isolation and inferiority that. when combined with an authoritarian and nationalist
disposition. produce an extreme-right susceptibility.
"l~5.92.
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One of the phenomena that bas attracted the most attention to the rise of righi-wing
extremism in Gennany has been hosrilily againsl foreigners. The appearance of neo-Nazi
terrorism in Germany was sobering for much of the population. The previous c:landesline
activities of these radical groups were traditionally limited to outbursts of Nazi propaganda
and anempts to use threats and bombast to place themselves in the public eye. However. the
most militant groups in the 19805 used a far more radical and aggressive manner
reminiscent of Hitler's SA brown-shin paramilitary methods. Pro-Nazi activities such as
youths painting swastikas, SS runes. Nazi slogans championing nationalism and racism and
wearing unifonn-like clothing (black leather. army belts. army and parachute boots) took
place all over Germany. An especially militanl and active extremist group that has crept into
the youth societies ofa number of Westem nations is the skinheads. Originally organized in
Great Britain. this subculture or extremely radical and violent young people became quite
visible in the' 19805. The skinhead phenomenon was exponed from Great Britain to the
United States and continental Europe. The skinheads~ not considered to be noo-Nazis by
mosl specialists. What is lppartt1t is that these often extremely violenl youth ~
incorporated into neo-Nazi groups as "soldiers". Many ~ intrigued by the neo-Nazi
militarism and the symbolism associaled with the Nazi past. This leads to oppommities for
-ChristopbefHlIsbands. ~MiliWlI_NazwnintbeFedenI RC'publico£GermaJ:lyintbc: 1980s.··TbeFu
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violence. justified by the need to protect meetings or to strike: against minorities who are
deeme:d available targets for the "soldiers".s'!
The primary targets for nco-Nazi terrorist activities over the past two decades have
been foreigners. AccQrding to the Hamburg Ministry of Interior, as of the: fall of 1986 the
righi-wing radicaJs were increasingly using violence against immigrants and asylwn-seekers
from third world countries.90 Terrorist-rdated actions that were attributed to righi-wing
militants showed a steady increase from the mid-19705 through the 19805. According to the
Federal Ministry of the Interior, righl~wing extremist crimes rose: from 136 in 1974102,475
in 1982."1 During the next de:eade, there were at least twenty~five deaths attributed 10 neo-
Nazi terrorist acts. These included the 1980 deaths of two Vietnamese students in a youth
hostel in Hamburg which were blamed on members of the Manfred Roeder's neo-Nazi
group Deutsche Alaionsgruppen. Nco-Nazi terrorists targeted Turkish immigrants into the
mid-19805. Ne:o-Nazi affiliated skinheads were involved in the brutaJ murder of a Turk by
the name of Kaymakei. In July, 1985, these militant nco-Nazis who were constantly against
foreigners, particularly the Turks, were looking for a victim. Kaymakei was a convenient
target and was killed with little remorse. Later, the same group of skinheads killed another
Turk and his friend in Hamburg.
The aururnn of 1991 marked a victory for violence in Gennan politics. In the Saxon
town of Hoyerswerda. hW'ldreds of locaJ residents joined neo-Nazis in terrorizing and then
forcing out 230 foreigners living there. What was in fael a pogrom was conducted for six
days under the watchful gaze of police officers who did nothing to intervene while a Nazi-
"lewis, 98.
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led racist mob put its victims under siege by smashing their windows and beating them with
baseball bats and bicycle chains in the streets.'! Hoyerswerda "Germany's first foreigner·
free city" was the flashpoinl for an autumn of horrific violence where, during October. 1991
alone there were, according 10 the BlUldeskriminaJamt (Germany's main police agency). 904
acts of racist violence. including 167 firt:-bomb anacks and 683 cases of c:rimina1 damage
and other violent behaviour. Opinions conducted during the autumn of 1991 suggested some
measure of public suppon for the avalanche of violence. Polls organized shonly after
Hoyerswerda and published. in De,. Spiegel indicated that 21 percent of East Germans and
38 percent of West Germans "had sympathy for the aims of the right radicals·,.qJ
In the opinions of different analysts, these violent acts were all motivated by
xenophobia. The victims were seen 10 deviate from some other nann. Schmidt asserts
thai these acts have a common denominator and a goal. ''to drive away or eliminate
anyone who is different or who appears to be differenl".'U The xenophobic feelings on
which the continuing violence is based have a wide resonance within the Gennan
population. Nowhere was this shown more frighteningly than in the Baltic city of
Rostock at the end of August, 1992. There the stonning and fire-bombing of a house for
foreigners by Nazi-led hooligans was applauded by thousands of local residents. The
police were passive and senior politicians openly expressed sympathy with the Fascist
rioters. However, this sympathy with the rioters went far beyond Rostock. A poll carried
OUI by the Infas Institute eight days after the Rostock pogrom followet1 the same pattern
" 510$$, Politics Aninsl Dcmo<:racy. 166.
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as polls laken after Hoyerswerda. A funher Infas survey broadcasl on lelevision in
Seplember, 1992 showed thai 26 percent considered the slogan ~foreigners OUI~ wholly
or largely justified. that 35 percent agreed thai "Germans should defend themselves in
their own counlry against foreigners~ and that 5 I percent supponed the slogan '"Germany
for the Gennans".~
The increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees has provided the
impetus for panicularly negative and hostile responses to foreigners in Gennany over th~
lasl decad~. However, these reactions are not simply a contemporary concern. Since th~
economic downturn of 1973 immigrants have been blamed for a pl~thora of problems.
These include increasing unemploymenl levels, rising crime rates and welfare costs. The
problem of immigntion is an issue that has attracted anention due to the increasing
number of immigrants and lhe violent ~xplosions of xenophobia that are taking plac~ in
several European countries.
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Chapter IV
The immigratioD problem
Although racism is not new in Europe. discussion of the immigration issue and
hostility to foreigners during the past decade have increased concerns about the rising tide of
racism that Europe is experiencing. In many respects. there is nothing new in the expression
of hostility towards immigrants. From the earliest days of the post·war migration.
immigrants have had to face anger and resentment from sectors of the indigenous
population. panicularly over competition for scarce resources in the spheres of social
welfare and employment. However. what is new about today's expression of racism and
xenophobia is that anti-immigrant campaigns tend to be legitimized by presenting
immigrants as a threat to the integrity of the nation. In this sense. the problem of
immigration is viewed not only as an economic problem. but also as an identity problem.
The increase in the inflows of immigrants that have entered Western European
countries during the past decades has taken crisis proportions in tenns ofOOm the number of
immigrants and their impact on the politics and societies of the receiving countries. It has
been difficult for the people and govenunents of Western Europe to deal with the social and
cultural realities of immigration in pan because of the strong sense of ethnic and national
identity in states such as France and Germany. The identity problem associated with
immigration is panially explained by the new wave of immigration that is affecting Western
Europe. Whereas in the past most of the immigration was intra-European. the new trend in
European immigration includes people from non-European countries. mainly North African
or Arab nations. The influx of millions of non·white immigrants. refugees. asylwn seekers
"
and migrant workers inlO West European societies has profoundly altered the social and
cultural basis ofthese societies.
Inler.European migrations were under way before 1940. They were stimulated both
by political and economical factors. Industrialized nations drew workers in from
neighboring countries. Italians to France and central Europeans to Gennany. This process
gathered momentum in the 1950$ and reached a peak in the 19605 when the buoyancy of the
economies of the major industrial countries of Northern Europe led 10 labor sbortages.'IO
Governments recruited around ten million immigrant workers., the European labour market
became internationalized.. and during this period. the countries in the North started to recruit
workers from fonner colonies and from the Medilerranean periphery. The migration boom
lasted until 1974. It was broughl 10 an end by the general recession. which had serious
effects on many European economies. After the oil crisis of late 1973. the industrial
economies of Western Europe were subject 10 varying degrees of decline with increasing
levels of unemployment everywhere.97 The need for immigrants ceased. Measures to block
funher primary migration led to stabilization and even a decrease in the nwnber of foreign
workers bUI failed 10 reduce the ovttall size of the resident foreign popUlation. Instead.. the
measures changed the narure ofmass migrations. The migration of family members replaced
the migration of single workers and migration increased from non·European countries.
.. RusseU Kina. wEuropeanlnlcmatiolul MiptioD 1945·9O; a Stlitistieal and Geographical Overview-.
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Today in Europe. Germany is the princip.al recipient ofimmignltion with inflows of
about 1.200.000 foreigners in 1992 and nearly 990,000 in 1993 (excluding ethnic Germans).
Following Qennany is France: with about 100.000 new immigrants per year (table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Fordgn or immigrant popuhztion in sdected European countries by thousands
and as 4 fUrCl!ntage o!totalpopulation
1983 1993
T1fou$IUI.ds % T1fousands %
FranCl! 1.714 U 1.597 ~J
Gf!r1rI_y, 4.515 7.' "'7' U
Belgium 89\ 9.0 92\ 9.1
Ito(1' 38\ 0.7 987 1.7
l.=Lmbourg 96 26.3 125 31.1
Sweden 397 4.8 508 5.8
Switzerland 92. 14.4 1,260 18.1
United Kingdom 1,601 2.8 2,001 3.5
Sourc:~.- TrolCU in fm~riJJllQ.l M,grarlOn. AIIIIUII ~port 1')94. v,,<.. ....
lo... rarl'l'l) ......"'Gmnlny_ro.19lJW....... a.nr.... ...ly
Immigration in France
France has an extensive colonial past and immigration has occurred in many cases
because of the historical ties resulting from this situation. A distinctive fea~ of French
immigration policy derives from the fact that France allowed unrestricted entry for many
immigrants from fonner colonies and it also promoted enay from the Mediterranean region.
Racial or ethnic background mattered less than being francophone, that is cultural/)' French.
A central characteristic of French colonial rule was the imposition of French culture and
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language on the colonized areas." French oveneas territories were administratively part of
France. wilh all that it implies in terms of social.. economic and political rights. In the past
France could identify itself as a universalist nation. As. a colonial power. its aims included
bringing to colonized people progress. science. education and reason. The idea was that
France was the only nation that could really do so. Even decolonization. under General de
Gaulle. was characterized by the idea that as a universalist nation. France had 10 playa
leading role in self-detetminarion of other nations.""
The immigration policy of the post.WaT era reflected the ideal of the French
Republic as an asylwn for refugees and a country receptive 10 immigrants from all nations.
The French tradition of human rights has welcomed and integrated waves of immigrants.
Universalism claims that people are the same everywhere. lbis view was also influenced by
the continued low birthrate and shonage of labour power. By the end of the Second World
War. there was a unanimous agreement in industry and government that France needed
immigrants in order 10 provide the labour needed to revitalize the French economy.lOO Some
experts estimated that an additional 5.3 million inhabitants were required to compensate for
the decline in population resulting from the losses of the Firs!: World War. high mortality,
and continuing low natality. In 1947 Algerians were granted Frmch citizenship. They
immigrated to France and became pennanent residents. During the war of independence in
Algeria, the number of Algerians arriving in France continued to increase with 70,000
.. Anlhony Fi~lding. ~Migntioll$. llutirotiODS aDd Politics, lh~ Evolution of Eauopean Migration Policies-.
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arriving each Wmt during October 1962.101 Some of them were colonists of European
origin who were unwilling to remain under the new regime and returned to metropolitan
France. Others were more like exiles or refugees than repatriated Frenclunen. These so
called harkis and moghaznis were men and women of Muslim origin who had worked for or
assjSl:ed the French army and civilian bureaucracy. The new National Liberation Front
government consi(kred such people to be collaborators with the colonial power and
threatened them with death or prison. 1l1ose who were able to leave Algeria were granted
French nationality. Despite their service to France. they did not always find a warm
welcome. 102
In the 1950s, immigration was viewed as an important asset. esp«ially since most
newcomers were from culturally companble neighbouring countries such as Italy and Spain..
As the French economy boomed in the 1960s. authorities rapidly lost control of
immigration. Instead of recruiting more labour from culturally compatible countries. the
newly independent stales of North Africa (Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia) became the
principal suppliers of foreign labour. IOJ By the mid-I960s, however, Algerians were
~m.ing the most nwnerous immigrant group. Because of their special post-colonial status.
they had virtual freedom of movement into and out of the country. The result was the
creation of a large undocumented foreign population in Fr.mce.
By the early 1970s, French immigration policy was influenced by growing anti-
immigrant sentiments. The rapid increase in Algerian immigration convinced the Pompidou
"'Simrnons..1S2.
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government that something had to be done to regain control of immigration. The deep
recession of 1913 which brought an end to the post-war boom confumed this judgement.
Authorities feared the economic and social consequences of the large nwnber of Algerians
who wished to enter France, especially after continued incidents of extreme-right violence
against immigrants. French and Algerian authorities negotiated agreements giving Algeria
more control over potential emigrants and France more control over Algerian immigrants in
France. At the same time lhat France tried to reduce the large nwnber of Algerians entering
France. they faVOW'ed immigration from other countries in North Abica and from
Yugoslavia and Ponugal. The new government under Valery Giscard d·Estaing took
dramatic steps to stop the immigration floW; authorities called an official hall 10 further
immigration on any meaningful scale by relying on admin.istrative measures 10 try to stop
immigration. reparriate immigrants and deny rights of family reunification. However. even
though the National Immigration Office bad a monopoly over recruianent, immigration
escaped governmental control. Immigrants arrived spontaneously and in direct response to
the needs of private capital. During this decade !hen: was a high increase in the number of
illegal immigrants who entered the country; the issue of immigration became politicized as a
consequence_l~
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Immigration in Germanv
Since 1890 Germany bas had a history of immigrants and foreign workers. In the
early nineteen century the principality of Mecklenburg. for example. couJd maintain itself
only by importing Poles and Swedes.. After 1890 a sysl:em of CODtracts between Germany
and Italy which did not cease until the late 19305 provided for the importation of Italians.
Poles with German citizenship were brought to GeTmany throughoul the industrial
revolution and afterwards. Germany imported seven million foreign workers during the
Second World War. In Ihe early posI-war period. the economic boom forged a consensus
among business and labor groups to opt for a policy of importing labour. rather Ihan taking
industry. capital and jobs offshore in search of lower labour costs. This was Ihe largest
guesrworker program in Western Europe, which would evenn.wly bring millions of young
Turks. Yugoslavs and Greeks to work in German industry. The unlimiled supply of ethnic
German refugees and displaced persons from Eastern and Central. Europe, including
refugees from the GDR, suddenly ended with the consuuction ofme Berlin Wall. The use
of foreign labour from the Mediterranean countries began in earnest. Intergovernmental
agreements were negotiated with Greece. Spain, Turlcey, Morocco. Portugal. Tunisia and
Yugoslavia. These agreements strictly controlled the ci.rcum.stan«:s under which temporary
woders were rttIUited to meet the labour needs of major Gennan manufacnuers employers.
In 1973 Ihe federal government decreed a halt to recruitment The oil crisis had
ended the era of rapid economic growth and full employment. Since then, mass
unemployment bas not been below the million mark. lOS The government introduced a
repatriation policy intended to reduce unemployment. GuestWorkers were to rerum to their
county of origin. The opposite happened because guestWOrXers made use of the right to
bring their families into the country and inunigration continued to develop, initially in the
form of family reunion and latO' through refugee entries. During the early 19705 Gennany
was the country that received the largest number of guestworkers with 2.6 million in
1973.1011 By 1915 the efforts of the Getman government to reduce the number of immigrants
entering the country were rewarded when during this year the FRG accepted only 366,000
immigrants and refused the emryofanotber 655,000. 107
Since the end of the 19705 and until 1981, immigration of resettlees and asylum
seekers grew with about 50,OOJ resenl.ees and 30,000 to 100,000 refugees arriving per year.
After 1987, there was a dramatic increase in immigration of ethnic Germans and asylum
seekers, up to more that 600,000 in 1992. 108
German immigrants
Despite the large number of immigrants residing in Germany, the German
government refuses to aclaIowledge Gennany as a country of imrnigrams. Because of this
refusal, newcomers are not called immigrants. Instead, they are referred to simply as
Auslaender (foreigners), even when they have been in Germany for decades and are
formally citizens.
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Erhnic Germans
Although in Germany there is no official recognition of the tenns immigrant and
immigration. there are different types of regulations regarding the status of foreigners in
Gennan territory. One is the policy of Volkdeuuche which applies to non~tcrritorial ethnic
Germans who were residents before May 1945. According to article 116 of the Basic Law.
ethnic Germans living outside the country are allowed to return and settle in the Federal
Republic and claim their nationality. Thanks to this article. it has been relatively easy for an
inhabitant of an East Ew-opean country with a paIent or grandparent designated as ethnic
German to immigrate to Germany. According 10 the Basic Law. a Gmnan citizen is either a
person who de jure holds German citizenship. a spouse or descendant of persons who were
settled in the Gelman Reich in Dc:cember 1937, as well as refugees or deponees with
Gennan ethnicity. The concept of German nationality, contnuy to that of France, relics on
jus sanguinis. Following this principle., the nationality of the parents devolves upon their
children. Jus sanguinis is more restrictive because generations of people born in Germany
cannot become Germans because their parents did not hold German nationality.
Kemper asserts that during 1989 there was a net migration of 48,000 Turks, 15.000
Greeks and t 18.000 Poles who were acknowledged as ethnic Germans. 109 However, despite
their righl to claim German nationality, returnees have not been recognized as German
nationals by most of the native population According to Betz, in 199\ only 13 percent of
the German population was willing to accept all aussielder and 43 pert:enl thought their
1011 Richard Munch, RGel1l'Ll.D Nation and ~rman Identity", Gel1l'Ll.Dy in Europe ill the Nineties. ed. Bertcl
Heurlill (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996)2S.
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numbers should be drastically reduccd.110 As a conscqueoce. the Kohl government has tried
10~ preferential treatment 10 Gc:nnan nationals in the countties where they DOW live in
the hope ofpersuading them 10 stay there. However, because ofthe divisive effects of such a
policy and turmoil in Eastem Europe, resettlers have continued to arrive. In 1990 new
regulations were passed compelling resettlers 10 demonstrate their Gennan origins before
being allowed entry into !he Federal Republic.
Gastarbeiter
While ethnic Germans have immigration rights and an automatic entitlement 10 full
citizenship, non-Gc:rman immigrants and their descendants still have only limited access to
citizenship. The Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) recruitment policy applies to those people who
were brought to Germany from recruitment countries and who (despite having established
themselves in German society). have no rights or membership in this society. III The largest
group of guestworlcers is composed of Turks (most of them Muslims). According to
Askenaski by 1990 there were a total of 4,600,000 forei~ living in Gennany, 1,600,000
of whom were Turts. lI2 The number of Turks in Germany has remained fairly stable since
1980 with internal growth and a relative high binh rate. Other groups of guest workers
include African and Asian people.
Rotation was a basic principle of the guest worker migration system. Migrants were
encoUtaged to come and work in Gennany as long as their labour was needed in the
factories and on building sites. although only on the basis of shon-Ienn contracts. At the
11OBea..lUdicaIRight_Wing.IOJ.
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lermination ofthe conttaet or after a 6rst or second renewal, the guestWorkers were 10 retUrn
to their countries to be replaced by new primary migrants. The employers believed that the
foreign workers would only Slay for a limited time in Germany. long enough to save
sufficient money which would allow them an independent existence in their home countries
10 which they were expected to return. However. when the end of the economic boom came
in the early 19705. facing the risk ofnot: being able 10 return to Germany, the majority of the
guesrworlc.ers decided to stay on.111
In 1983 a policy of selected repatriation was instituled, which aimed to reduce the
number of foreigners by offering them financial incentives if they were prepared to renun
home. lbis policy, however, achieved little because it did not offer a real solution 10 the
problem of W1etttployment in the host country. The official argument to justify the measure
was that the home countries would benefit from the qualifications the rttuming migrants had
obtained while working in Germany. However. because of the poor working and living
conditions in their home countries and the policy of family reunion introduced by the
German authorities. the return did not take placc.ll~
Most of the foreign workers were employed either in expanding industries such as
the automobile or the mer.al-processing factories. or in unattractive trades such as steel mills.
In both cases, a low level of qualification was required. Workers were housed in hostels.
Physical separation from the host population reflected their economic and political status
within the country. They had minimal rights, could nol vote, and could be deported.
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However, despite the short-term nature of me contr.lcts and the low social and civil status
attached to lhem. a large nwnberofguestworkers settled down in their host country.
Refugees
The last regulation regarding citizens of other countries wanting to settle in Germany
is the asylum law, which refers 10 refugees. Because ofits past, for a long time Germany had
the most liberal asylwn policy in Western Europe.II' In an effort to expunge the memory of
the concentration camps and to rehabilitate Germany's reputation in the inlernationaJ
commWlity. !he Gemtan Constitution guaranteed tha1 virtually all foreigners persecuted on
political grounds could claim the right to asylum. Anyone applying for asylum could~
the slate to take care of him while his claim was being processed. Procedures would take
about one year to complete, applicants would appeal and cases would lake as long as four
years until asylum was granted or an expulsion ordered.ll~
During the past ten yean. all of West Europe has wimessed a dramatic increase in
the nwnber of political refugees. Within Ewope. Gennany is the country that has attracted
the largest population of refugees. According to Fekete, during 1993 then: were in Germany
332,000 asylum seekers, the largest groups coming fiom Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the
fonner Yugoslavia. West Gmnany experienced consecutive waves ofEas! Getman refugees
in the 19505, Twits in the early 1970s and again in the 19805 and 19905 ethnic Germans
fiom the former GDR or other pans ofEastem Europe.lll
, .. Ul'$uJa Muller.ter Blotevogel and Gerald Wood, MFrom ltinennt Wllfker to Mi&nJ1t? The Geopphy of
Guest-Workers in Germany'. Mus Mimlion ill Ewope. The Leney and the FulUrc. ell.. RlWell King
(London: BdhavenPress.I993)88.
IIJBea.R.ldieaJRigbl-WilIg.76.
, .. ADtbonyMessioa. '"TbeNot50Siletlt Revolution.PosI.warMiptiooIOW~Europe.MWcxld
Politla{49:1996) 143.
TTT[iii"Fekete aDd Fruc:es Webber. Inside Racist Europe. (Loodoo: Institute orRace R.elationl. 1994) 25.
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Due to the increasing number of asylwn-seekers and the difficult economic situation
that native Gennans were experiencing, the established political parties decided to toughen
Gennany's generous asylum law. In 1992 a new legislation restricted access for asylum-
seekers and other immigrants curtailing their rights of appeal and facilitating expulsion. At
the same time. Germany reached agreements with some East European countries in which
these countries agreed to take back nationals who had fled to Gennany to escape
persecution. According to the new regulation, the right to asylum was refused to all those
coming through or from Europe. Those coming from any other country deemed sale must
provide compelling evidence of persecution. The list of safe countries includes Romania.
Bulgaria. Ghana and Pakistan.111
Racism and Xenopltobia
There is a little doubt thai the number of incidents involving Germans and
immigrant or refugee populations has increased; however. this mayor may not reflect
racism as typically defined. Xenophobia. rather than racism. is a more useful term to explain
hostility towards foreigners or groups that are different Although the term xenophobia is
used as a synonym for racism, it should IX)( be equated with the racism that characterized
Nazism or white supremacists. This conception bas been especially complicated in Germany
where the tenn racism carries the weight ar.d stigma of the past Race as a legitimate basis
for scientific categorization and hierarchisation of people has been discredited. and with it
the concept ofracism.
7\
Racism takes a new fonn in the present political environment where lheR: is a
widespread confusion about national identity and the role of culnual. religious and linguistic
diffemK:eS_ I " The racism of recent times has stig:rnatizcd non-European ethnic minorities
tl1at are perceived as simple rivals in the struggle for scarce resources. This racism is about
prosperity. and prosperity is white. Western. European. 1be asylum seeker. refugee or
immigrant is invariably non-white., or if white, poor and unsen1ed.. IXI For Betz. "Racism is
the belief that history represents a struggle between races rather than classes or nations.
Racism is the belief in the superiority of one's own racial or ethnic group. In its extreme
form racism caIJ for the annihilation of other racial or ethnic groups. In less extmne form, it
denies other racial or ethnic groups equal "ghts and opponunities regardless of their
willingness to assimilare and to accuJrwaJe. By contrut. xenophobia derives from mixobia:
the foreigner is detestable only in that he is postulated as being inassimilable without
provoking a destruction ofcommunity identity. This lends to provoke defence mechanisms
which r.mge from avoidance of !hose considered as others.. their exclusioo andIor
segregation in gbetto:s 10 verbal and physical attacks on Ihcm and !heir property." 121
Much to the annoyance of some native citizens. West European societies have
becor.te increasingly multic:lhnic. multiracial and multicultural. Results of Western
European swveys on foreigners reflect a growing concern about the visibility of non-
European cul~. The notion of a multicultural society finds suppan only among a
11' John Solomos aod Jobo Wrench.. ~Race and Racism. ill ContmlpOf'Il)' Europe.~ Race and Mimlioc in
~esfem Europe. ed.. Jolin Solomos and Jobo Wreoch (Oxford; Be:ra, 1993) 7.
Liz Fekm: aod Fraoces Webber. wide Racist Europe. Cl.onOon: lDstinJfe or Race Rtbtions. (994) y.
l:I 8elz.bd.ic:aJriP-WiIli. 173.
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minority.1ll In 1992 only n percent of the German population w~ in favour of
multicultwalism while 49 percent did DOt even know what it meant. In France in 1993. 83
percent of the population agreed that fomgners had to integrate themselves into French
society and abandon their customs contrary ttl French culture. III
Extreme-right parties consider multiculturalism as a major thmu to Western
civilization; their ideological core is built around the confrontation between national identity
and multiculturalism. Both the FN and the Repub/ikaner promote themselves as the
defenders of national interest and identity. Extreme right-wingers justify their attacks on
foreigners less because of the colour of their skin than because their cultures are held 10
threaten national identity. U. The FN as well as the Repub/ikaner have intensified their
campaigns for the protection of the interest of the native population against new demands
thai are bound to arise from those lobbying in favour of immigrants and refugees. Identity
has become a central issue in France and Germany. According to Claude Levi-Strauss.,
identity is "like a focal point 10 which we inevitably must refer in order 10 explain certain
things, though it never has a real existence".m In response to multiculturalism. extreme-
right parties promole racism and do not s.eeIr:: to give a place to immigrants. but to rid the
country of those people who belong to different cultures and cannot be integrated.
III MulticulfUralism implies the praruee oftbe cu.lfUral and linzuistic ri&hts o(a minority. These include noe
only lhe righe to individual and collective expres.siOll, bur also the provision o(necessary servke5. A
mu.lticultunipolicyalsoinc!udesar.mgeO(tneaSUreSloCOW11erdiscrimillationtoensu.reequ.aJ.opporumitiesin
all areas. and above all, 10 combal racism-In olber \VOIds, rile ootion ora muhiculnnl soc:iety includes 001 only
respeelllld suwon for foreip1 c:ulNl'eS, bul also respeec for life sryles aod pefSOlW pre(CI"C'DCeS lbal differ from
lhoseoftbemajorilyoftbepopulalioD..
,u Bett.RadicaI Righl-Wi!Ij:, 95.
:~ ~vu.lIID1igt!tioQ,Race aod Et!micity in Contm!l!O!!f)' FratlCe. (NY; Roul1edge:, 1995) 27.
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The Eurobarometer opinion polls carried out for the European Community (EC)
reveal the IXIPular reaction to the presence of non-EC nationaJs. 126 The November 1989
special report of the Eurobarometer on Racism and Xenophobia indicated that half of the
Europeans interviewed thought that lhen: were too many non-EC immigrants in their
panicular country. The impression of an excessive presence of foreigners was particularly
sErOng in France and Germany: 56 percent of French respondents expressed this feeling as
did 55 percent of Germans surveyed. The restrictive attitude towards workers from outside
the EC was directed mainly towards people originating from the Mediterranean region
especially in France, where the debate on immigration is strongly related to the problem of
national identity.
Figure 4.2 shows that the share of foreigners from non-European countries has
increased and certain nationalities have either appeared or gained in importance compared to
others that have been present in the region for a tonger period. The kind of foreigners
present in Europe from the Mediterranean basin (the Maghreb, Turkey, former Yugoslavia)
has changed. France has remained the principal host country for North Africans and
Algerian immigration is concentrated almost entirely there. 1l7 Germany, on the other hand,
remains the country where the greatest nurnber of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia is
to be found; Germany also has the largest population of Turks in Western Europe.
,:16 Commission oflhe European Communities, Ellfobaromeler. Racism and Xenophobia (Bnwels; CEC.
(989).
':1 Franee has received back a large number of rapatries from its former Nonh Afriean colonie:; and
prole<:lorales. especially Algeria. Due 10 the war of liberation and 10 the facI thaI the country bad been l
senlement colony produced more repatriateS Ibm did most other situations ofcoloniallibel'llrion.
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Figure 4.2 Maghrebian, Turkish andformer Yugoslav residents in France and Germany
as a percentage oftl'e total offoreign population, }993.
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During the recent past, Germany has been receiving the majority of immigrants from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. both because of geographical proximity and
because of the German origin of certain citizens of eastern European countries who are
considered German citizens by right (Aussiedler). Although hostile attitudes towards
immigrants in Germany include not only non·Europeans but also East Europeans, results
from the 1989 Eurobarometer show that most of the problem of immigration is associated
with the presence of immigrants from non-European countries.
According to the Eurobarometer, opinions about immigrants or the others relate to
individuals from another race, religion, culture and nationality.128 When asked about people
from other races. 63 percent of Germans associated this concept with black people and 39
percent ofFrench related it to Arabs. Islam was the religion most mentioned when they were
asked about people of another religion (73 percent of Germans and 52 percent of French).
When asked about people from another culture 24 percent of Germans answered Turks.
while in France 15 percent mentioned North Africans and other 15 percent indicated
III Commission, 35.
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Muslims. For 63 percent of Germans, Turks came to mind as people from another
nationality, whereas for 55 percent of French, those were North Africans. These data
support the fact that although there are immigrants from different nationalities, cultures,
religions and races, Muslims or North Africans are the stereotype of immigrants.
Although in the past intra-European migration supplied most of the immigrants to
countries such as France and Gennany, the new trend in European migration includes
people from non-European countries, mainly North African or Arab nations.
Figure 4.1 Distribution ofimmigrants in Frrznce by continent
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Figure 4.3 shows a substantial decrease in the number of European migrants entering
France during the past five decades. European migrants have been replaced by North
African migrants, especially Muslim people, which exacerbates the feeling among some
members of the native population that North Africans represent a threat 10 their national
identity because they are culturally different.
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Figure 4.4 Comparison of Turkish and Italian immigrants in Germany as a percentage
ofthe fouign population
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Source Compilation ofthe Federal Statistical Office (Staristisches Bundesamt) and Trends in Internarional
mlgrarion by DECD 1994
Table 4.4 shows a significant change in the composition of the foreign population of
Germany. During the early 19605 the Twkish community was one of the smallest groups of
foreigners residing in the country; Italians. on the other hand, were the largest group of
immigrants entering the country. However, the 19705 inverted this trend. Today, Turks fonn
the largest group of foreigners residing in Germany and the proportion of Italians has
declined.
Idenu", and the problem orImmigration
The problem of immigration is strongly related to a crisis of national identity that
seems to be taking place in many Western European societies. Cultural difference has been a
Slrong element in the way Western Europeans feel about the issue of immigration. In
France, for instance, the Front National links argwnents about the social costs of
immigration to an ideology of difference, namely thaI immigrants from North and Black
Africa, most of whom are Muslims, cannot and will not assimilate into French culture and
n
that their culture poses a "'moIta..I tluea1 to the preservation of French culture and
trad.itions~"l9 In the Fifty measunson immigration outlined by Bruno Megm in 1991, th~
FN proposed to substirute the principle ofjus sanguinis or race for jus solis or residence as
the: basis for French citizenship.I)O Megret claimed that these measures could be seen as part
of the ecological movcmenl since they were aimed at preserving the French species..
According to these measures. there would also be quotas imposed on Ihe number of
immigrants in classes, ethnic gheROS would be dismantled. Ihe construction of mosques
would be suspended and the opening of schools and Islamic centers would be regulated.
During the past several years. the various perceptions about immigrams and refugees
have come together in the image of Ihe Muslims. The Islamic presence is a factor Ihal has
induced uncertainty across moS! of the political spectrum aboUI French identity. In th~ 19805
the FN began to focus on religion as Ihe defining characteristic of the North Aftican
commtmity aDd as the single most important reason why North Africans could never
assimilate into French society. Le Pen began to warn of the miliwy risk posed to France by
the foreign population. Muslims threatened to condemn the French to become a minority in
their own country; therefore, he asserted that "as long as we are alive. France will never be
an Islamic Republic~. III The feelings ofmany Fn:nc:h people are rooted in antipathy towards
specific values and practices associated with minorities. especially Islam. However. il is
among Lepenistes that an antipathy towards ethnic minorities reaches its highest level.
111 Simmons. 160.
uo French citizenship is based on the principle orjlC solis. which means that beillg born on Frencb soil
carried willi il !be acquisition or French lI.IliOPality. This CODlnSlS with the law or jus sanpi"is. which
applies ill Germany and wbere righlS are &ivm only to lbosc born or parents who arc GemwI ~rionals.JIC
solis racilitates natwaliution ~ause birth on French soil is sufficiml 10 comer citizenship. As in many
other COll.D.tries, ill F~. the poueuion or acquisition or nationality is the key dctcrmiDant in many
politieal and civil rights. Kemper. 259.
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Because of the resentment linked to decolonizalion in North Africa and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in these counaies, Arabs are more often perceived as a threat to national
identity than Jews. black Africans or Asians. Not only are FN sympathizers inclined to reject
minority groups. whatever the colour of their skin. their religion or the country they come
from. but they "do it quite openly with more than three out of four describing themselves as
ratheroralittleracist".1J2
Uncertainty about the Muslim presence can be shown in the HeadscaTVeS affair.
which erupted in 1989. In October 1989 three girls ofNonh African origin. all ofwborn
were pupils at a secondary school in Creteil in the suburbs of Paris. claimed their right 10
keep their heads covered in the classroom in conformity with the n:quirements of Islam.
Since French law prohibits all fonns of religious propaganda in state schools. the
headmaster. who considered the action of the Muslim girls (0 be provocative. asked the girls
10 cease wearing the scarves in the classroom. Failing 10 do so would result in suspension
from school. Insisting on wearing the scarves. the three girls were suspended from school
for a few days and were allowed 10 go back subsequently withoul the scarf: Soon after. the
girls returned wearing the headscarf and for a few weeks they were asked to stay in the
library during class hours..
The FN used the incident for political propaganda arguing that the incident
demonstraled a fonn of religious and cultural colonization of France that threatened its very
identity with extinction. Since immigration was the root cause of these problems. the FN
argued. most immigrants should be sen! back from where they came. At the heart of this
U'Sirnmons.98.
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issue was the position that French society was prepared to accord to immigrants. panicularly
those ofNorth African origin.
Incidents like this symbolize the difficulties regarding the proper recognition of the
position and role of the Islamic community in France and the fear of the for-eigner. deeply
rooted in French society. According to Husbands, there have been numerous studies
documenting the racist bias and pttjudice in the manner in which the media have reported
certain stories which featun:d immigrants eN" foreigners. m Much of this research has
revealed a general xenophobia against inunigrant workers. An important technique of
sensitization by the mass media is reponing aspects of Islamic life-style in a manner that
reflects negatively upon it. lbcre has been a clear exaggeration in the images of these
populations. in the description of their communities. in the threat of fundamentalism or
Islamic terrorism.
The headscarves affair served to eatalyze French opinion on the issue of immigrants
in France, particularly those of North Africa. French opinion was aheady hostile to
immigrants. A poll taken by SOFRES for I.e No~l Obsel'Wleur in November 1992 found
that 68 percent of French people favoured the prohibition of the entry of new immigranls
into France and 25 percent said they would like most immigrants to go back home. 74
percent were opposed. to granting the right to vote in local elections to inunigrants who have
been living in France and 64 percent thought that the children of immigrants should adopt
W Noam Mayer a. Pueal Pmirleau. ~Whydo~ Vote (or Le Pen'?"" Europea.n Joumal o(Polirieal
R~b(22:1992).IOl.
Husbands, -rbey Must Obq' OW' La","S and CUSlOmS!; PolitiaJ. DeNte &boIIt Mlalim
Auimilability iII Great Britain.F~ aDd !be: NetbertandsM • bcism.. Ethniet!y aDd Polities ira
CoIllemponry Europe. eO.. Alec Hargreavn mel Jemny Leamm, (Ea&Jand: Hannolb LId. Nodmin.
Corn....all. 1995) IU.
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the customs and values of French society.'~ At the time of the headscarves affair. a poll
taken by IPSOS found that SO percent ofFrench people were afraid oflslam.
The economv and the problem o(immigration
The problem ofirnnUgranon in Germany can be studied from a different perspective.
Although arguments about the threat to national identity have emerged in the discourse of
extremNight panies. the problem of immigration in Gennany is bener explained in
economic terms. As a result of the libera1ization program in the Soviet Union and the
eruption of domestic turmoil in Eastern Europe. Gennany was confronted with a growing
number of ethnic Gennans seeking repatriation from the fonner East bloc and mainly East
Gennany. Due to the high costs of unification, Gennans temporarily experienced a
reduction in their standards of living, increased inflation and social instability. In the fonner
GDR unemployment and a massive economical restructuring confronted a population used
to state-allocated work, planning and an institutionalized grid of opportunities and social
roles.
Part of the resentment against foreigners is reflected in the view that immigrants
contribute to unemployment; in Germany, fear of losing one's job to cheaper foreign
workers is one of the most common pen:eptions associated with immigration among
marginalized people. Although a significant number of Europeans not only recognize the
contribution that foreign workers have made to their economies, but also that foreign
workers perfonn many jobs that unemployed natives refuse to accept, many still see them as
IlO Brechon. 75.
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taking away scarce jobs from the native unemployed.IH Different studies indicate thai
foreign labour is gc:ncn.l.ly most tbmilcned by redwxiancy. Gut:$( workers are most likely 10
be among the fust to be negatively affected by the rationalizalion and modernization of the
economy. According to Bett. immigrants conb'ibule to unemployment., but less by taking
away jobs from natives !han by adding to the overall rate ofunemploymc:nL Ilft
There are also some feelings that foreigners exploit the economic and S(XiaJ system
at the expense of the native people. Migrants are accused of becoming rich because of
public welfare. In Germany, foreigners are accused of taking advantage of the democratic
ReicJuraat and exploiting the social system. The same siruation occurs in France, where
thCf"C is a perception among certain sectors of the population that immigrants are much more
clever at getting welfare and perverting the system which according to them "has not been
aeated for unemployed people with three wives and tCfl children".m
The increase in the number of immigrants from non-European countries has
aggravated the way some Western Europeans feel about the issue of immigration. Among
some sectors of the population they arc pcJt:eived not only as a threat to their national
identity but also as competitors for employment and services. Xenophobia and the problems
associated with immigration are imponant elements in understanding the rise and appeal of
the extreme right.
"
Chapter V
ConciusioDs
Although we have not been able to provide additional data directly linking
inunigration and support for the extreme right, there is considerable evidence connecting
immigration with the success of the extreme right The Iiterarure includes useful poll and
survey data that pennilS US to establish a relationship between the ri~ of the extreme
right and the problem of immigration. However, this relationship is complex.
Immigration itself cannot be the sole causal factor influencing the vote for the extreme
right. Considering this is equivalent to arguing that a level of general xenophobia exists
among Western Europeans. Although xenophobia is one of the elements explaining the
rise of the extreme right. it is not simply xenophobia that seems to attract voters to parties
of the extreme rigtn. The cultural and economic problems associated with immigration
also explain the rise of the extreme right. When immigration is linked with problems such
as multiculturalism or the economy, prospects for significant extreme right electoral
support remain strong.
Success ofrhe u:.rreme right
Although parties of the extreme right are far from holding power, they have
gained electoral support and have succeeded at exploiting the issue of immigration and at
influencing mainstream politics. lmmigration is an issue that has become increasingly
imponant in Western democracies, especially in France and Gennany, which an: among
the main recipients of immigrants in Western Europe. The increasing number of
"
immigrants entering Western Europe and their diverse origin has raised question about
the compatibility of these immigrants with the native population and has sometimes
resulted in violence. Immigration is an issue that appeals to a substantial portion of the
population. providing parties of the extreme right with their best political opportunity in
decades. The extreme right uses this issue as the main element in their programs. By
exploiting immignltion they appeal to the fears of the most alienated sectors of the
population. Although their diversity makes it difficult to establish a profile of extreme
right voters. we can assert that those at the bottom of the economic ladder are more
receptive to the discourse of the extreme right. However. what distinguishes such voters
from the rest of the electorate is the importance they give to issues such as immigration
The extreme right has also been successful at influencing mainstream politics.
During the last decade established parties and politicians have modified their appeals in
order 10 attract voters from the extreme right. Because parties of the extreme right have
gained support using immigration. established parties. from both the right and the left
have snuggled to show supponers that they are tough on immigration. In several
instances. it has been the extreme right which has set the tone of the debate on the issue
of immigration. As an example. both the socialist goverrunent of Mitterrand and the
conservative government of Jacques Chirac have made attempts to toughen laws on
immigration. In Germany, as a response to the increasing wave of violence against
foreigners. the Kohl government toughened the asyhun law and has negotiated
agreements with neighbouring countries to stop the now of the immigrants intending to
enter Germany.
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The extreme riglu and the issue o(immigration
Although most parties of the extreme right are parties whose policies cover a wide
range of issues, immigration and national identiey are dominant themes. The issue of
immigration represents not only a phenomenon present in different European
democracies, but also something very much linked 10 the way European society is now
developing. Large majorities of the French and Gennan populations, believe that there are
too many foreigners residing in their countries and that immigration has become one of the
most important problems facing their societies. 1J8 Intolerance towards persons or groups
persons with different racial. religious, cultural. social or national backgrounds is evident.
For certain sectors of the native population. immigranlS have become the scapegoats for
most of the Western democracies' problems. Inunigration has been linked to
unemployment, urban crime, delinquency and most of society's ills. In France, for instance,
the immigrant has been '"resurrected as the traditional scapegoat for all of France's ills... LJ9
Immigration has become for many a symbol for a complex pattern of concerns such as fear
of unemployment, housing problems, rising crime, AIDS, drug abuse and uncertainties
about France's place in the world and the meaning of what it is to be French.
lmmigration is certainly a problem. for many people the problem, and there is a
perception that governments have done little about it. Few mainstream political leaders have
been willing or able to deal with the issue successfully; instead, govenunents in both France
and Germany have struggled to demonstrale to voters that they are tough on immigration.
"
1be inability of the established parties to provide an answer to this problem has
favored the development of the extreme right, which has chosen immigration as its k.ey
element. The immigration issue has enabled the extreme right to clajm nationalism and
patriotism as its foremost values. In the case of Germany, for example, reports of the
Ministry of the Interior show that the extreme right has gained members since it chose
hostility towards foreigners as its key theme. l~
It has been the right-wing extremists· ability to crystallize the growing sense of
alienation and the increasing fear of crime into a single YaH embracing~ issue.
immigration. which has accounted for the extreme right's success. Extreme-right parties
constantly remind their voters about the economic and cultunJ aspects of immigration by
asserting that immigrants not only cause economic problems but also represent a threat to
their hosts' cultures and identities.
In France. the FN is severely critical of the social costs of immigrants. arguing
that they are major contributors to unemployment. delinquency and crime. and that they
impose a burden on the French economy. The From contends that immigrants make up a
disproportionate number of delinquents and criminals. I'" In order to m~ this threat, the
FN put forward a comprehensive anti-foreigner program. the central point of which was
repatriation. Its core elements were spelled out in the Fifly Measures on Immigration
proposed in 1991 by Bruno Megret, the director ofLe Pen's presidential campaign in
1988, and designed 10 create conditions conducive to settle the problem of immigration
and to protect national identity. According to Megret, laws should be rewritten to
,.. Kolinsky. ~A Furun ror Rigbl.Win. Extrmtism iaGermany'."". 83.
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accelerate the expiration of immigrants' residence permits. thereby rendering the
COUnlry's three or four million legal immigrants illegal, and illegal immigrants would be
deported. He also asserts that the return of immigrants to their original countries will
solve many problems. It would, for instance, save public finances, resolve the problem of
a threatened national identity and promote national cohesion. In his view. it would also
solve the problem of security and it "would certainly be the solution for
unemployment... I<u
For the Front National. the top priority is to challenge immigration. the blame for
which is artributed to the French govemment over the years and to enforce national
preference. National preference means putting French citizens fust in their own country.
They would have first call on scarce state provisions such as health-care. housing and
welfare benefits. This would also entail discontinuing any assimilation of foreigners to
nationals by laws and regulations. expelling any immigrants who behave in ways
unworthy of French hospitality and gradually repatriating others. I.-J According to the
Front's president, Jean·Mane le Pen, everything comes from immigration and
everything goes back to immigration. The immigrant is the enemy within, denounced as a
potential offender. as a drain on stale resources and as a competitor. All ethnic minorities
are described as an uncontrollable demographic and territorial threat. They are perceived
as responsible for Wlcmployment. overcrowding in schools. currency drain. rising crime
'01 Bruno Megret a quoted La Philip GourevilCh, 139.
lU Vaughan. '1be &rmn: Rigbl in Frmc~~. 224.
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rate and spread of AIDS. For I.e Pen, the immigrant issue is not so much a symptom as a
cause of the spiral of moral and cultural decadence into which Fnlr'ICe has sunk. 1M
The FN bas consistently affirmed its concern about France's decline and its desire
[0 sec French national greamess re-established. In their view, French identity has evolved
during a thousand years of hiSl:ory during which it has been transmitted from generation
to generation. To belong to the French people means being part of a line which connects
the present to the past and the future. sharing in that heritage and being guaranteed
exclusive rights to citizenship and preferential treatment with regard to jobs, housing,
social security and other benefits. According to the Front, the weakening of the family
and the drop in the birth rate among the French people makes the inflow of immigrants
and their large families increasingly threatening to an underpopulated France. For the FN.
immigration posses a deadly threat to French national identity. lmmigration is seen as a
foreign invasion, albeit peaceful. but whose long-term effects will be the same as ..the
incursion ofalien bordes, prepared to fight when denied bread, wine and women". 1~~
The FN asserts that the genetic and cultunl threat to national integrity must be
resisted by a nwnber of policies. Some of these are intended to protect the French family
(the mother in panicular). while others are restricted to the rights of inunigrants. whether
to the acquisition of nationality by binh on French soil or to family allowances. Abortion
is fiercely opposed by the party in line with the movem~nt's fcars about the loss of
,.. JmIe$ Shield1. "The PolilicsofOisaffe<:tlOD: France in Ihe 19805n Political Cult\l.tC: in France and
~.ed.JobnGaflileyaodEva Kolin.Uy(Loodon: Rout1edCe,I991172.
VlIUJhan, 1be OtJ'mlC R.i&hl in Frmcc-, llJ.
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French identity as a result of a declining binh rate in eontrasl to higher immignnt birth
rates. 1"6
In Germany. the most important issue facilitating the electoral and organizational
successes of the extreme right since the late 19805 has been that of hostility fOwards
foreigners. In domestic politics. the Republihurer warns about a flood of immignUlts
pouring into Germany, thereby undermining a social net and making the cowury a "welfare
office for the whole world... 1'7 In the years before unification the Repubtikaner had cwo
objectives. One was the restoration of national self-eonfidence and idenlity to the German
people as a precondition for the restoration of national unity. The other was to prevent the
threateningforeignization ofGennany by putting a halt to the growing influx of immigrants
and particularly refugees. The foreigner problem is at the center of the RepublikLJner's
political agitation md propaganda. They perceive foreigners and other outsiders as a threat
to German nation and its way of life. 1bey have focused onforeignization. a concept that is
integra! to the thinking of radical and extremist right-wing groups. The Republiluurer claim
that safeguarding the German Vol! means protecting future generations agaiM
foreignization because it represents dangers such as rising crime rates. unemployment and
social and cultural tensions. The party justifies its frontal attack against Germany's
immigration policies by arguing the need to prevent abuse of the asylwn law and 10 protect
the security of German citizens. With its program. the Republikaner has established a clear
,.. Hainsworth. Ibc Extranoe·R,ight in Post-wu France ., SO.
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identity. Appealing to widespread x~hobia and exploiting growing uncc:nairuy and fears
with regard to the future. it acts as a populist advocate ofthe interest of the small people.l.ll
Support for the extreme ncht
During the last decade, a growing sense of personal insecurity, linked to the
presence of immigrants and the demand for law and order measures appeared 10 increase
among some Western Europeans. The extreme right was bound to capitalise on these
negative emotions and claimed that they were daring to speak out on behalf of the
common people. Building on the fears of the electorate the extreme right has been able to
direct their electoral campaigns to the most alienated sectors of the population.
Although votes for the extreme right cannot be correlated with either lower socio-
economic status or the number of immigrants in a given economic area, it is possible to
assert that anti-immigrant politics have won sympathy among young, unemployed
sectors. the working and lower middle classes in wban and suburban agglomerations.
In Germany, the RepubJikmter have increasingly recruited their supponers among
those social groups most negatively affected by the industrial modernization process. Fear of
discrimination makes Republiko.ner sympathizers very receptive to anti-foreigner slogans.
Foreigners in Germany and the government's policy towards them are held responsible for
the real or preswned worsening ofconditions in the country. Eva Kolinsky explains that the
Modernisierungs\lerlierer (losers in the modernisation process). those who feel
threatened by technological innovation and the erosion of traditional qualifications and
work processes. are the potemial clientele for the extreme-right today. In comparison
with other sectors or groups in society, those at the bonom of the educational ladder and
at risk of de-skilling may regard themselves as disadvantaged in their income, lifestyle
and opportunities, even though their situation would count as advantageous in other
countries.l~q
However, different authors have argued that what distinguishes the supporters of the
extreme right from the genera! public is the priority they give to specific issues such as
immigration and law and order. The degree of importance attached to the problem of
immigration is highly affected by a political factor. The more an individual considers
himself to be on the right of the politicaJ spectnun, the more importance he attaches to the
problem.
Shields asserts thai among the major preoccupations expressed by FN voters are
themes of law and order and immigration. ISO Where immigration was high and could be
linked with themes such as urban blight, insecurity and declining standards, Le Pen polled
well. Compared with other voters, the FN voter emphasizes immigration as a factor for
voting behaviour, with insecurity and unemployment as the other top themes. According to
Hainswonh, interviews with FN members reveal their main concern to be the establishment
of a new moral order to overcome the alleged decadence and decline of France. Vaughan
also asserts that the avowed motivation for supporting the FN is the dislike and fear of
immigrants. linked with a concern for security. Thus, the two main themes of Le Pen's
discourse are clearly et:hoed by his supporters. Attempts to capitalise on moral panic are
:: ~~~~~7~:AFuture Cor Righi Exlfemism in Germany?". 78
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frequently associated with nostalgia for the past. prevalent among supporters of the
extreme right. lSI
The relationship between immigration. fear, insecurity and the rise of the extreme
right is confirmed by findings from opinion polls, Questions about the considerations that
influenced the decision to vote for the FN reveal the problem of immigration and the feeling
of insecurity as the major factors. According to different results, the electors of the FN
appear to have a worse perception of immigranlS than does the average voter. In 1985 FN
voters were three times as likely as other voters to have been motivated by concerns over
insecurity and delinquency and five times as likely to vote FN because of concerns about
inunigrants. IS2 According to a poll conducted in Grenoble in 1985. 55 percent of the
electorate sampled thought that there were 100 many North Africans in France, while 90
percent ofthe electors ofthe FN were of that opinion. IS) Sixty-three percent of the voters for
the FN thought immigration 10 be the cause of Wlemployment. compared to 26 percent for
the sample as a whole, There were similar findings on delinquency, where all FN electors
thought imrnigranlS to be the cause of delinquency, only 51 percent of the population as a
whole thoughl that to be the case,lS4
Support for the FN is strong in the highly industrialized regions of France. where Le
Pen has been adept at exploiting tensions over Wlemployment, immigration and rising inner-
city crime rates. According to Mayer, an important element in explaining the rise of the
extreme-right vote is less the size of the inunigrant population living in an area than the
"I Vaughan, "The Wrong Right in France", Opposition in WC:SlerD El1fi?!?l:, ed. Eva Kolinsky {NY: 51.
~~'5Prc55.1987)J03.
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feeling ofa threat linked to the prospect thaJ: its population nright expand. l " Their living in
close proximity to immigrants docs not motivate the anti-immigrant sentiments of Front
voters; this is rather a negative reaction of voters who live near but not in areas with foreign
populations. This suggests thal fear of immigrants., nl1her than actual proximity was what
seemed to correlate with support for the Front. However. an exception exists in the
departemenrs of the south. where a high proportion of North Africans immigrants coexist
with a large number of repatn'es from Algeria who are receptive to Le Pen's nationalistic
rhetoric and his nostalgia for Algerie FranflIise,
SUPPOI1et'S of extreme-right parties not only consider immigration one of the most
important issues in the political agenda. but they are also the most hostile group toward
immigrants. In Germany. Republikaner supporters have shown the least sympathy of any
politically relevant group toward immigrants. refugees or even German resettlees from the
fonner Soviet Union. Among self-confessed Republikaner voters. over 90 percent objected
to forrigners living in Germany. In France. FN voters are much more hostile to immigrants
than those who vote for parties of the left and mainstream right. A survey conducted by
CEVIPOF (Centre d'6ut!e de fa vie politique franflIise) after the second round of the
presidential election in May 1988. showed that in questions about the number of
immigrants. the power of Jews. the rights of Muslims and lhe feeling that they were not at
home anymore. half of the Lepeniste voters were the most pessimistic about the presence of
III Dati. from a poll conducted by Pierre Brechon and leaD-Paul BoZOClllel in Grenoble nn ~ basu ora
r~resentltivesample of548 eleelon in 1985,
, Brecbon.70,
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immigrants. A total of 7S percent of Le Pen electors Ihought that !here were too many
immigrants., as opposed 10 3S percent in the sample asa whole.l~
Th~ in.{luen~o(tlr~ extrDn~ right in. mainstream PO/uio
The extreme right has been successful in influencing mainstream politics. One of the
main achievements of the Front National has been me importance that the immigration
issue has acquired on the political agenda of the Frencb government. The Front. with its
anti-immigrant message has done much to keep the issue at the top of the agenda and the
related issues of integration and racism have assumed a permanent place in the French
national debate. Since the early 19805 French immigration policy has largely been
influenced by the rise of the FN.
The fN policy on immigration bas had considerable impact. mobilizing public
opinion. forcing the traditional right 10 re.examine the question of French nationality and
revalue immigration as a policy priority. During the past decade. France's traditional panies
have hardened many of their policies relating to irnJ:njgrants and ethnic minorities in the
hope of competing for the FN's vote. In 1986, the arrival of 3S FN deputies to the National
Assembly gave an immediate new focus 10 debates about immigration. The new
government. and its Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, was commined to restrict
immigration. The Pasqua Law passed in September, 1986 was intended to strengthen
frontier control and ease the expulsion of foreigners who were either in the country illegally
or had been convicted for a prison teon of more than six months. ln The victory ofCatherlne
Meg.-et in Vitrolles followed a revision of the immigration policy, with the proposaJ of the
Chirac government to tighten once more regulations on immigrants. Last year. Chinc's
Minister of the Interior, lean·Louis Debri, submiued a package of new immigration
regulalions to the French Parliament. The Debri Law was billed as part of an inlenl to
halt illegal immigration. A controversial article required French residents to get written
permission before overnight visits from foreigners requiring visas and 10 inform their
mayor's office after such guest departed. As a result, a protest movement began. There
were marches and petitions vowing civil disobedience. In late February 1997. tens of
thousands of people took the streets of Paris in a festive demonstration against the law
and what was described as the generallepeflizatiofl of the French spirit. In the end, the
controversial provision was removed even though opinion polls showed that nearly 70
percent of French voters scpported it.
In Germany, there is a concern that the political culture is moving to the right.
Parties have become more nationalist and conservative on the political asylum issue. As a
response 10 the increasing tide of violence against foreigners. the number of asylwn-seekm
and the difficult economic situation that native Germans were experiencing, the established
political parties decided to loughen Germany's generous asylum law. For a long time
Germany had the most libenJ asylum policy in Western Europe. In an effort to expunge the
memory of the past and to rehabilitate Germany's reputation in the international comnl1mity.
the German Constitution guaranteed that virtually all foreigners persecuted on political
117 CbrislopbefHusbands. "1be Mainstream Right and !be Politics oflmmigatioll ill Fraoce: Majoc
Developments in the 19805" Etb.D.ic and Radal Studies (14.2. 1991) 186.
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grounds could claim the right to asylum. Anyone applying for asylum could require the state
to take care of them while their claim was being processed. Procedures would take about
one year (0 complete, applicants would appeal and cases would take as long as four years
until asylum was granted or an expulsion ordered. In 1992 new legislation restricted access
for asylum-seekers and other immigrants curtailing their rights of appeal and facilitating
expulsion. Although the new regulations continue to grant protection and refuge to victims
of persecution, it makes it more difficult to claim asylum without justifiable reasons. The
Genoan govermnent excludes from the asylum procedure those foreigners who are not
obviously politically persecuted, such as those wbo bave already fOWld refuge in a .safe third
country (which includes Germany's Eastern neighbors) or those who come from safe
countries of origin where political persecution does not exist in principle.
In November 1997, the CDU/CSU blocked plans for a major reform of the 1913
Citizenship law, which denies automatic German citizenship to babies born in Gennany
unless their parents are already Germam. Under the proposal, supported by the SPD. the
Green party and the FOP, children born in Germany of foreign parents would be permitted
to hold dual nationality. Christian Democrats argued that dual citizenship would give the
impression that foreigners are more privileged that ordinary Germans. In a controversial
intervention, Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that Changing the law could easily lead to a
doubling of the number of Turks in Germany.
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Th~ /i.thn o{tlte extrem~ riglti
Extreme-right parties cannot be considcnd a strocI.g electoral or political force yet
However. the study of the rise of the extreme right is important not merely because of its
existence. but also for the overall social and political situation that their political relevance
reflects. The success of the extreme right goes beyond its ability to gain electoral support.
Extreme right parties are channels of political discontent and opting for them is in many
cases a defiant choice.. The existence of parties of the extmne right reflects not only a crisis
of tile political culture but also a symptom ofa sicmess in society. Right-wing extremism is
the reflection of deeply rooted feelings such as racism and xenophobia. which are associated
with the problem of immigration.
Although racism and xenophobia are two of the characteristics thai: differentiate
parties ofthe extreme right from oUter political parties. they are no! restricted to the extreme
right; racism can also be present among many Western Europeans who support mainstream
parties. According to the Eurobarometer. one European in three believes there are too many
people of another nationality or race in his country.151 In Ute Declaration against Racism
and Xvwphobia of JWle 1986. !he European Parliament recognized the existence and
groWliI of xenophobic attitudes, movements and acts of violence directed mainly against
immigrants. Xenophobia appelUS as a fonn of self-defense against the uncertainties of the
future and the discomforts of the present. Xenophobia has become a hallmark for societies
seeking scapegoats for the temporary economic hardships that people are being asked 10
accept.
I·Corrunis:r;ioIl.4.
Racism and xenophobia are political tactics that used in the right circumstane:es
by skilful politicians could be successful. Exploiting resentments and popular rears has
turned into a successful strategy ror the extreme right. It is difficult to rorget that the Nazi
rise to power was in part the result or certain ideas having widespread currency but that
needed a particular set or circumstances to turn those holding such views into Nazi
supporters.
The rise orthe extreme right should not be ignored just because its chances or taking
power at pre;ent seem remote.. Whether the rise or the extreme right will be contained in a
permanent fashion still remains 10 be seen. Factors thai. contribute to the success or the
extreme right such as immigration, unemployment and insecurity are unlikely to disappear
and as long as they remain, the polenrial rOf the upsurge or the extreme right exists.
Although there might not be an extreme right breakthrough to power in the near future.
racism and xenophobia will continue to be imponant elements in European society and
politics, and as long as they exist, there is a chance ror the extreme right.
"
Bibliography
Ashken.asi. Abraham. "The Turlcish minority in Germany and Berlin." Immimnn ,nd Minoritircs.
9.3 (1990) 303-316.
Atkinson. Graeme. wGermany: nationalism. Nazism and v;olence.·· Racj$l vigleocc in Eurone, Ed.
Tore Bjorgo. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1993. 154-166.
Baringhorst. Sigrid... Symbolic highlights or political enlightenment? Strategies for fighting racism
in Gennany." Raci'iffi e!bnicjry and politjc:; in cgntemporary Europe Ed. Alec Hargreaves
and Jeremy Leaman. England: Hartnolls Limited. Nodmin, Cornwall. 1995,225-239
Betz, Hans-Georg. Radical Right_Wjng populi'im in wcnc:m Fmope New York: St.Martin's
Press, 1994.
--. ~ The new politics of resentment Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe:'
Comparati~Pglitics 25.4 (1993): 413-427.
--. pggmodNlJ politics in Gt:rmlny. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
Bjorgo. Tore. Mlntroduetion. Terror from !hs:; extrptls:; riRht London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.
1995.1-6
Blotevogel H. Ursula Muller-ter and Gerald Wood. "From itinerant worker to migrant? The
geography ofguestworkers in Germany." Ma:;'i migTlljon jn furors:; The leRacy and !be
~ Ed. Russell King. london: Belhaven Press, 1993.83-100.
Booth., Heather. The migratign proceu in Britain and We:« Gs:nnany England: Avebury, 1992.
Braunthal. Gerard. - The rise of right.wing extremism in the new Gennany'". Tbs:; dgmwic politic:;
gfGmnan Unification Eel Christoper Anderson. Karl KaitenthaJer and Wolfang luthardt.
Colorado: Lynne Rienned Publishers, Inc. 1993.97-1 13.
Brechen. P. and S.K. Mitra. .. The National Front in France. The Emergence of an Extreme
Right Protest Movement." Comparative Politics 25.1 (1992): 63-82.
CilStles. Stephen. "Migrations and minorities in Europe. Perspectives for lhe 199Os: eleven
hypothesis." Bacism and mjwrjon in Western El'rollfj Ed. John Solomos and John Wrench.
Oxford: Berg, 1993.3-16.
Chapin. Wesley D. "Explaining the electoral success of the new right: the German case.~
Eumps:;an Pg!ilig 20.2 (1997) 53-72.
..
Childs, David... The far right in Gmnany since 1945." The far Rjgbl in Wmcm &. Ea:iJem EUrope
Ed. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan. England: Longman.. 1995
290-308.
Comfort, Nicholas. Brcwq'S Pplitj" England: Ca.s.sell 1995.
Commission ofme EwtJpcan Communities. EurgbamQX;lc:r Racism and Xmopbobia Brussels: CEC.
1989.
Conde. Lidia. .. Estos tipos dan miedo." Umlzi2...1.6. Feb. (1995): 24-26.
Ebata. Micro. -Right.wing extl'"CJTlism: in search ofa definition". The extreme ri1j1bt [mom ind
~. Ed. Aure:1 Braun and Stephen Scheinberg. USA: Westview. 12-35
faller, Jurgen W. and Siegfiied Schumann. .. Affinity towards right wing extremism in Western
Europe." West European polj!jcS 15.2 (1992): 92- 110.
Fielding. Anthony. "Migrations, institutions and politics: the evolution of European migration
politics." MasS mjgratjpn in Europe The Itgacy and !b~ filDlCf:, Ed. Russell King. London
Behalven Press, 1993.40-62.
Fekete, Liz and Frances Webber. Inside racist Eyrope London: Institute of Race Relations. 1994.
Fr~ John. paajCli ind yourrs in Eranc~. NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1991
Fysh. P. and 1. Wolfreys... Le Pen. the National Front and !he Extreme Right in France. -
Parliamentary Affairs 45.3 (1992): 309-326.
Gaspard. Francoise. A smil! cjty in Frang: London: Harvard University Press. 1995.
Gourevitch. Philip. "The unthinkable. How dangerous is Le Pen's NF7' The Nc:w Yodc:c:r. Apri128-
May 5 (1997) 110-149.
Hagtvet.. Bernt. "Right-wing extremism in Europe'" Journal pf Pra" Research 31.J (1994): 241-
246
Hainsworth, P." The extreme right in POSHvaT france: the emergence and success oftke Front
National..• The Ert«:ou: Bigbt in Eurooc and the USA Ed. Paul Hainswonh. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1992.29-59.
_._~-~'_.... [ntroduetion. The cuning edge: the extreme.right in post war Western Europe and
the USA." The: Extreme Right in Europe and !he ([SA Ed. Paul Hainsworth. New
York: St. Martin's Press. 1992. 1-29.
100
Hargreaves.. Alec G. (mmimripn A"&;yxI abnjcity jn c0ntMDllOpary F[Jnce. New York: Routledge.
1995.
Hargreaves. Alec and Jeremy Leaman... Racism in contemporary Western Europe: an overview:'
Rju;jsm ethnjcjry and POljtics in cgnrf:mPO[Jry Eurgps; Ed. Alec Hargreaves and Jeremy
Leaman. England: Hannol.l.s limited. Nodmin, Cornwall, 1995. ]·]0.
Harris, Geoffrey. The park Side of Europe' The EXJmnc Kisht Today Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1994.
Hoffman. Bruce. "Right-wing terrorism in Europe." U2D1li.a.. 5.] (1984): 185-207
Hollifield. James F. Mlmmigration and integration in Western Europe: a comparative malysis-
fmmjmrinn imn Wr;g<:m '5OCir:rjr;r Pmh1ems and poljcies. Ed. Emek M. Ucarer and Donald
1. Puchala london: Pinter, 1997.28-6].
House, Jim... Context for integration and exclusion in modem and contemporary France"'~
elhnjcjty and politics jn contemporary EuropC Ed. Alec Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman.
England: Hannolls Limited. Nodmin, Cornwall. 1995. 79-95
Husbands, Christopher T ... The o!her face of 1992: !he extreme-right explosion in Western
Europe.- Parliamentary AffiJjrs 45.3 (1992): 267·283.
---. ~ They must obey our laws and customs!: political debate about Muslim assimilability in
Great Britain, France and the Nelherlands." Racism exhnjcity and poljtjcS in CQntcmporary
~ Ed. Alec Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman. England: HannoUs Limiled. Nodmin.
ComwaI1.l995. 115-130.
--- - The Mainstream Right and the Politics of Immigration in France. Major
Developments in the 19805." Ethnic and Racia! Snldjcs 14.2 (1991): 110-198.
--." Militant ntl>NlU'ismin the Federal Republic of Germany in the 19805." The Far Risbt jn
Western and Eastern Eurooc Ed. Luciano Cheles. Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan.
England: Longman. 1995.327-353.
Ignazi. P. -'The silent counterrevolution hypotheses on the emergence ofextreme right-wing parties
in Europe... Eumpran lwmal ofPolirjcal Resarcb 22. 1 (1992): 13-28.
Inglehart. Ronald. "From class-based to value-based politics". ThC WW European party sy:ucro. Ed.
Peter Mair. NY: Oxford University Press, 1990.266-284.
Institut National de la Sratistique et de Etudes Econcmiques. Aan'lajrt Srltjstjquc de II F[Jnce.
lNSEE, 1997.
'"
Johnson. D. ~The new right in France." The Far Rjght in Western &:: wan Eurooc Ed. Luciano
Che{cs. Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan. England: Longman. 1995.234-244
Johnson. R.W. "Rebirth of the right. The extreme right may arise from the ashes of war."~
StalQrnan and Socie:ty4.141 (1991):10-15.
Kagedan, Ian 1. "Contemporary- right-wing extremism in Germany. 1M ma:me-righl Frcqlom and
~ Ed. Aurd Braun and Stephen Scheinberg. USA: WestView Press, 1997. 107·
137.
Kemper. Franz-Josef. "New trends in mass migration in Gennany:' Mass mjgra!jgn in Euroge The
legacy and the future. Ed. RusseU King. London: Behalven Press, 1993.257·274.
King. Russell. "European international migration 1945-90: a statistical and geographical overview.·'
Mass mjmrign jn Euronc The leglCY and the futua:. Ed. Russell King. London: Behalven
Press, 1993. 19·]9.
KitscheJt.. Herbert and Anthony McGann. Th:; radjcal right jn Wc;stern Europe USA The University
ofMidugan Press: 1995.
Kolinsky. Eva.. .. A future for right extremism in Gennany'?~ The EXlrcnu: Right in Eyrope
and....1ht..ll. Ed. Paul Hainsworth. New York: St. Manin's Press. 1992.61-94.
...._-. "Socio--economic change and political culture in West Gennany:' Pgljtical cylDm:
in France and Gcunaoy Ed. John Ga.ffuey and Eva Kolinsky. London: Routledge.
1991.34.68.
Krejci. Jaroslav..• Neo Fascism -West and East. ~ The Far Right in W¢srem &:: Sastcrn Eyrorn: Ed.
Luciano Cheles. Ronnie Ferguson and Micbalina Vaughan. England: Longman. 1995. 1-10.
•---_ .. Introduction: concepts of right and left." NcoWcio;m in Eumoc Ed. Luciano Cheles.
Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan. England: Longman. 1991. 1·8.
Krieger. Joel. Thc:Oxfnrd companigp fQ MljtjCS gCtbe wgdd NY: Oxford University Press. 1993.
Lewis. RandC.~. New Yode: Praeger. 1991.
Mackie. Thomas and Richard Rose. ThC [ptcmatjgoal Almap" of Electoral Hjstgry london:
MacMillian, 1991.
Mair, Peter. pany wS'Cm change ApproachCS and jntemrclaligpS USA: Oxford University Press.
1997.
Maolain 0 Ciaran. The Radical Rjeht A wgrld directgry. UK: ABC-CLIO. 1987.
102
Marcus. Jonathan. The NatjQnal Front and Fa;nch Politics' IlK; Rcsinib1e Ris Qf Jcan-
~ London: Macmillian, 1995.
-- ·Advance or consolidation'? The French NF and the 1995 e1ections.~
fgjillg.19.2 (1996) 303-320.
MataS, David. ·The extreme right in the UK and France". The C'Ormle right Frcqlom and ¥:gIOty
iIL.IiZ. Ed. Aurel. Braun and Stephen Scheinberg. USA: Westview Press. 1997 12-35
~ayer. NoMa. - Ethnocentrism and the Front National vote in the 1988 French Presidential
election." Racism c1hnjcity and politics jn CQntCUJOO[Jry EuropC EeL Alec Hargreaves and
Jeremy Leaman. England: HartnoUs Limited., Nodmin, Cornwall. 1995.96-111.
--and Pascal Perrinau. -Why do they 'IOIe for Le PenT Euroocan Journal Qf Poljtical RCKarch
22(1992): 12J-141.
Medellin. Gabriela. EI nCQnazjsmg cn la Alemanja conteIDoo@nca Mexico. D.F.: utA., 1995
Merid Peter. ~Radical right-wing panies in Europe and anti·foreign violence: a comparative essay:'
Terror from the clCtccmc-dghl. London: frank Cass and Co. Ltd.. 1995.96-118
Messina, Anthony M 'The not so silem: Revolution. Post-war migration to Western Europe.~
fQli1jg. 49.1 (1996) 130-154.
Minkenberg. Michael. ~ The new right in Germany. The tratLSfonnation of conscrvar.ism and
the extreme-right." European rgumal gUQljligl RC'itirsh 22.3 (1992): 55-81
Min Subrata. 11te National Front in France. A single issue movement'?" W§J Europcan Pglitics
15.2 (1992) 47-64.
Mudde Cas. "Right-wing extremism analysed. A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three
alleged rigtne:xtremistparties(NDP. NPD CP'86)." Europqn Jmlmal gFPoljtical Rcgarcb
27 (1995) 203-224.
__m • -The war of words defining the extreme-right party family". Wcn European PQlitics 19.2
{19%):225-248.
Muhtberger. Detle[ .. Germany. "The SQcia! Basis gf European EasciSI Moycments Ed. Detlef
Mublberger. Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1987.40-139.
Munch, Richard. "German nation and German identity". Gcnnany in Europc in thc nineties Ed.
Benel Heurlin. GO: Macmillan Press. Ltd, 1996. 13-40.
103
Ogden., Philip. 1be legacy of migration: some evidence from France." Mass mjgratjon in fllronc
The; lacy and lhe 611\'": Ed. Russell King. london: Bdhaven Press., 1993. 101·(17
Organization for Economic Co-operar:ion and Development (OECD). Trmds jn Inu;matjooa!
mi&mtiJm Paris. France: SOPEMI. 1992-1994.
Phillips. Peggy Anne. Repub1jgn France Djvidc:d IminO Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood
Press. 1993.
Read, Mel and Alan Simpson. Aping a rising ride Racism Eyrope ,nd Im Great Britain: Russell
Press Ltd, 1991.
Rist. Ray C. G!I!:stWQrkm in Germany Jbc prospects for plUGljsm. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1978.
Rollnick. Roman and Deidre Mooney. ULe Pen on long march 10 Pans,"~ 13-19
February (1997) 3.
Schmidt, Michael. The new Rt:jch Violent extremism in unj6ed ('twany and beyond Trans. Daniel
Horch. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993.
Schmidt, Thomas. "'Right-wing radicalism in the unified Gennany." The resurgence of righi_wing
radjcaljsm in C'tnnany Nt:w fom" ofan old phenomengn? Ed. Ulrich Wank. New Jersey:
Humanities Press. 1993.69-84.
Shields. James G... The politics ofdisaffection: France in the 19805." poljljcal ""lyre jn France and
~. Ed. John GaffiJey and Eva Kolinsky. London: Routledge, 1991. 67·90.
Silverman. Max. .. Rights and difference: questions of citizenship in France. "Racism etbnjcity and
politi" jn ro"tc:mpgrary fI!moc Ed. Alec Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman.. England:
Hannolls Limited. Nodmin. ComwaJJ..I99S. 253-264.
--, DcrAnsxDlCJing Ibe nation Immjgration raciSm and citizenship in modem France london:
Routledge. 1992.
Simmons, Hatvey G. The Fr;ncb Harjo"al Front The CjXlrnnig challenge to demgcracy USA:
Westv'iewPress, 1996.
Smith, Anthony D... The dark side of nationalism: the revival of nationalism in late 20th century
Europe." The fir right in We:ncm and Eastern Europe. Ed. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson
and Michalina Vaughan. England: Longman, 1995. 15·19.
Solomos, John and John Wrench. "Race and racism in contemporary Europe." Race and mjgQljpn
jn Wgtern Enrope Ed. John Solomos and John Wrench. Oxford: Berg. 1993.3-16.
'04
Soucy. R.J. " France." The Social Basis pf European Fascig Movements Ed. Detter MuhJberger.
Great Britain: Croom Helm, 1987. 190-212.
Stemhell. Zeev. Neither Right nor I eft FugS Ideology in France. Trans. David Maisel. Los
Angeles: University ofCalifamia Press. 1986.
---. Mana Sznajder and Maia Asheri. The Birth of Fucin Ideology From "'!h,ca! Rcbelljoo
to Pglitical Reyghl'jgo. Trans. David Maisel. Princeton: Princeton UniversixyPress, 1994.
Stoss. Richard. " The problem of right-wing extremism in West Gennany.M~
faliIig 15_2 (1992): 34-46
--. PoIjrigagaiosrdcmgcnH:y Right.wingpctrcmjWinWcs Gmnany New York.: Berg. 1991.
Vandermonen. Christian and Jean Vanlaer. "lmmigranu and the extreme-right vote in Europe and
Belgium." MBa mjgration in Europe The !egaw and the fiib!re. Ed. Russell King. London:
BehaJven Press, 1993.257-274.
Vaughan, M. '"The extreme right in France: Lepenisrne or the politics of fear.- Ik..Eat...B.iah
in Western & fMtmJ fUroos Ed. Luciano Cheles. Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina
Vaughan.. England: Longman. 1995.215-233.
--, .. The wrong right in France." Oppositjon in Wcsem Europe. Ed. Eva Kolinsky. NY
5t Martin's Press.. 1987. 289-317,
Veen. Hans-Joachim; Norbert Leipzy and Peter Mnich. The; Repllblikinc;r pany in G¢rminy
Right_wing menace or prmeS catch all? Washington D.C.: Praeger. 199]
Von Beyme, Klaus... Right-wing elCtremism in post·war Europe." West European Pglitics
15.2 (1992): 1-18.
Wesde. Betinna and Oskar Niedermayer... Contemporary right-wing extremism in WCSI Germany.
The Republicans and their electorate... (iumPt'o Journal of PoliTj,,! Rf:$Wfb 22.3 (1992):
8)-100
Wieviorka. Michel. iendencies to racism in Europe: does France represent a unique case. or is it
representative ofa trend?," Racism and migratjon in west«:m Europe Ed. John Solomos and
John Wrench. Oxford: Berg, 1993, 55-65
Willems, Helmut. "Development, patterns and causes of violence against foreigners in Gennany:
social and biographical characteristics of perpetrators and the process of escalation.....rmw:
woo the;e;rtremt=rigbt. Ed. Peter Merld. london: Frank Cass& Co. ltd_, 1995. 162-181.
'05
Wilpert, Czarina. "Ideological and. institutional foundations of racism in the Federal Republic of
Germany."Bacism and mjgration in W'ntCI'D Eyrope Ed. lohn Solomos and John Wrench.
Oxford: Berg. 1993. 67-tH.
Williams Philip. Crisis ,,"4 Compromise Politics jn 111$: [911Gh Republic GS: Longmans, 1964.
Williams, Philip M. and Martin Harrison. Politics and Spciety in de Gaulle's Republjc. Great Britain:
Longman. 1971.
Withal de Wenden, Catherine. W Ethnic minority mobilisation against racism in France."
Radsm "haiON aad politics in c;gntm!P9ljVY Ellrppe Ed. AJec: Hargreaves and Jeremy
Leaman. England: HartnoUs Limited, Nodmin, Comwall.l99S. 240-252
,..
Couatry 1946 1975 1981 1990
Al eria 1.2 20.6 21.7 17.1
Italy 25.9 13.4 9.2 7.0
Morocco 0.9 7.6 11. 15.9
Portugal 1.3 22.0 20.7 18.1
Spain 17.3 14.5 8.8 6.0
Belgium 8.8 1.6 1.4 1.6
Poland 24.3 2.7 1.7 1.3
Yugoslavia 1.2 2.( 1.7 1.5
Tunisia 0.1 4.1 S.2 S.7
Turkey 0.4 1.5 3.3 S.S
Other 18.6 9.9 14.4 20.3
SDllrce: AlIlIllai~ Statistique de/a Fr'Qllce 1997. INSEE 1£ '1lIStitllt Natia"af de fa Starut!que n de Etlldu
Eco"ollliqun.
Country 1961 1m 1983 1993
rue< 9.2 6.5 6.4 S.l
Italy 43.6 18.7 12.4 8.1
Spain 13.1 S.7 3.6 1.9
Turkey 2.1 23.4 34.2 27.8
Yugoslavia 3.3 17.0 13.5 13.5
Portugal 0.3 3.( 2.2 1.5
Po and oJ. oJ. 1.9 3.8
Austria oJ. oJ. 3.8 2.7
Romania oJ. oJ. 0.2 2.3
Hungary oJ. oJ. 0.4 1.0
Other 28.7 25.6 2\.4 32.3
Source: Compilatio" ofthe Federal Slatistit:al Offia (Starutichu BundullJrlt) and Tre"ds i" /nternan·o"al
Migratiolt by OECD f994.
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